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Tax indemnification transfers from a firm to an outside party the risk of potential cash 
settlements associated with uncertain tax positions taken in prior years. The current accounting 
treatment of tax indemnification under Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 805 and the 
required disclosures for uncertain tax positions under ASC 740 provide little or no information 
regarding this risk transfer in the financial statements or notes. I examine merger and acquisition 
(M&A) contracts from 2008 through 2013 and find that tax indemnification is commonly present 
in M&A transactions. I then provide evidence that the association between current uncertain tax 
benefit reserves and future tax cash outflows is positive for firms that do not have indemnified 
tax positions but is not significant for firms that do have indemnified tax positions. Because the 
use of tax indemnification and tax insurance is becoming more common among U.S. firms and 
this trend is expected to continue, my results suggest that changes in the accounting treatment of 
uncertain tax positions and/or additional financial statement disclosures may be necessary to 
allow financial statement users to adequately assess the impact of uncertain tax positions when 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
I discuss the accounting standards for tax indemnification under Accounting Standards 
Codification (ASC) 805 – Business Combinations and examine whether these accounting 
standards provide sufficient information to financial statement users to assess the impact of tax 
indemnification on future tax cash outflows for firms completing mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As).  Specifically, I examine whether the presence of tax indemnification moderates the 
association between unrecognized tax benefit (UTB) reserves and future tax cash outflows 
among M&A firms. Tax indemnification transfers from a taxpayer to an outside party the risk of 
potential cash settlements associated with uncertain tax positions taken. Though tax 
indemnification transfers the responsibility of these contingencies to an outside party, ASC 805 
coupled with ASC 740 require that the acquirer continue to reflect indemnified tax positions in 
UTB reserves after the M&A is completed. Moreover, ASC 805 and guidance under Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) Federal Regulations part 210 do not allow firms to reverse the 
mirror accounting entries originally used to record the indemnified tax positions when adjusting 
these positions later due to the expiration of their tax statutes of limitations.1 Therefore, the 
required accounting and lack of disclosure may hinder a financial statement user’s ability to 
adequately assess the potential future consequences of indemnified tax positions within UTB 
reserves.2 
Traditionally, tax indemnification was primarily provided by contract clauses to facilitate 
M&As. However, over the past few decades, it has become increasingly common for tax 
                                                          
1 Mirror accounting refers to journal entries in which a liability is recorded with an identical corresponding asset (or 
vice versa) resulting in no effect to overall equity; i.e., the UTB reserve for an indemnified tax position and the 
corresponding tax indemnification asset are the reflected accounts when recording an indemnified tax position. 
2 Practitioners share this concern. See §10.6.1 of the Price Waterhouse Cooper Guide to Income Taxes at 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/cfodirect/assets/pdf/accounting-guides/pwc-income-taxes-guide.pdf. 
2 
indemnification to be provided by third-party insurers (Logue, 2005; Wolfe, 2011). The 
development of these insurance markets has led to tax indemnification being present in other 
aspects of business; for example, companies utilize tax indemnification insurance to facilitate 
raising capital and protect against operating risk (Wolfe, 2011). Therefore, it is important to 
understand how the required accounting and lack of required disclosures for tax indemnification 
impact a financial statement user’s ability to assess tax information provided in the financial 
statements when tax indemnification is present.  
To explore tax indemnification and the related accounting issues for firms with M&As, I 
obtain a sample of 355 M&A contracts filed with the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, 
and Retrieval (EDGAR) system from 2008 through 2013, inclusive. I review the tax matters and 
indemnification sections to identify which M&A contracts include tax indemnification clauses. I 
find that tax indemnification clauses are present in approximately 80 percent of my contract 
sample. Using a modified model from Hanlon, Maydew, and Saavedra (2018) and seemingly 
unrelated estimations, I further document that the association between current UTB reserves and 
future tax cash outflows varies significantly in the presence of tax indemnification for firms 
acquiring uncertain tax positions in M&A transactions. Specifically, I find a positive association 
between current UTB reserves and future tax cash outflows for firms acquiring tax positions 
without tax indemnification but find no significant association for firms acquiring tax positions 
with tax indemnification. These results suggest that tax indemnification may moderate the 
association between UTB reserves and future tax cash outflows for firms completing M&A 
transactions. Moreover, these results are robust to changes in my design choices, such as using 
interaction models instead of seemingly unrelated estimations, using a shorter sample period, and 
using different control variables. 
3 
Furthermore, I compare observations without M&As to various subsamples within the 
M&A contract sample to ensure results are applicable to a larger set of firms not engaging in 
M&As and to provide some confidence that earlier results are likely due to the presence of 
indemnified tax positions. I document that observations without M&As and observations with 
M&As but without indemnification exhibit similar associations; specifically, both exhibit 
significant positive associations between UTB reserves and future tax cash outflows. 
Furthermore, I document that observations with M&As but with indemnification do not exhibit 
this positive association. These results are consistent with tax indemnification reducing the 
association between UTB reserves and future tax cash outflows and are not solely attributable to 
engaging in an M&A.  
Next, I attempt to identify a proxy for the presence of tax indemnification to aid financial 
statement users in assessing the association between UTB reserves and future tax cash outflows 
when M&A contracts are not available. I begin by testing whether the presence of M&As can 
proxy for tax indemnification since tax indemnification is present in 80 percent of the contracts I 
examined. Using a sample of 8,567 firm-year observations from 2,237 firms, I find that both 
firms without and with M&As exhibit a positive association between UTB reserves and future 
tax cash outflows generally.  However, when the sample is restricted to firms that report an 
increase in prior year UTB reserves and completed an M&A this association is not significant. In 
addition, I explore whether the presence of non-public targets, M&A deals with consideration of 
less than $1 billion, and non-merger M&A contracts may be used as proxies for tax 
indemnification due to systematic differences documented in the descriptive statistics. I find that, 
while the association between UTB reserves and future tax cash outflows varies when firms are 
separated based on the presence of non-public targets and the amount of consideration paid for 
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M&As, there is no readily available information that adequately proxies for indemnified tax 
positions.  For this reason, I conclude that financial statement users would benefit from having 
access to more specific disclosures about tax indemnification to properly evaluate various tax 
accounts.  
Lastly, I document that tax indemnification may influence a firm’s ETRs as well as the 
association between deferred tax assets (liabilities) and future tax cash outflows. Specifically, I 
document that firms reporting indemnified tax positions have lower future mean and median 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) ETRs and higher future mean and median cash 
ETRs than firms without indemnified tax positions. The potential distortion of these commonly 
used financial measures may have a significant impact on financial statements users’ decisions. 
In additional tests, my results suggest that indemnification may also moderate the association 
between deferred tax assets (liabilities) and future tax cash outflows. However, further research 
is necessary to explore these findings. 
To my knowledge, this is the first academic study to discuss the accounting and 
disclosure issues arising from tax indemnification and to empirically test whether tax 
indemnification moderates the association between UTB reserves and future tax cash outflows.  
My findings suggest that investors in firms which report indemnified uncertain tax positions 
within their UTB reserves would benefit from disclosures of those positions separately so that 
they can adequately assess the expected impact of uncertain tax positions on future tax cash 
outflows. These findings may be useful to standard setters if and when they consider making 
changes to ASC 740 and ASC 805. 
5 
Furthermore, interviews with M&A consultants suggest that markets for tax 
indemnification insurance are growing.3 The growth of tax indemnification insurance markets 
has led to tax indemnification being present in settings not related to M&As. Firms which 
purchase tax indemnification insurance for uncertain tax positions related to other types of 
transactions are susceptible to similar accounting issues experienced by firms obtaining tax 
indemnification from M&A contract clauses. Unlike the M&A setting, it is highly unlikely that 
additional disclosures about the presence of tax indemnification, such as those in M&A 
contracts, would be available in a non-M&A setting for outside financial statement users to 
examine.  Due to the expanding tax indemnification insurance market, it is important for 
researchers and investors alike to understand potential issues with reporting indemnified tax 
positions.  
Moreover, my study answers the call of Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) for research on 
how acquirers deal with targets’ prior uncertain tax positions. My results suggest that tax 
indemnification clauses within M&A contracts are often used by acquirers to protect themselves 
from uncertainties surrounding a targets’ prior tax positions. However, anecdotal evidence 
provided during interviews with key M&A consultants suggests that tax indemnification 
insurance is becoming more commonly used to facilitate M&As. Due to confidentiality 
agreements and the lack of disclosure requirements regarding tax indemnification insurance, 
empirical data is not readily available to explore these markets. Further research is required to 
specifically explore the impact of tax indemnification insurance on the usefulness of tax 
information in the financial statements. 
                                                          
3 Several high-level consultants were interviewed through phone conversations about tax indemnification, tax 
indemnification insurance, and M&As. However, all the interviewees requested anonymity. Therefore, the 
interviewees’ names, associated companies and titles are not disclosed for purposes of this study. 
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This study further contributes to the ongoing literature stream on UTB reserves. In 2007, 
UTB reporting was standardized under Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48) with the goal of increasing comparability and relevance of tax 
reserves.4 Though past studies generally conclude that FIN 48 did result in more consistent 
disclosures of uncertain tax positions, these same studies question the informativeness of these 
disclosures (Gleason, Mills, and Nessa, 2018; FAF, 2012). Prior researchers have suggested that 
the informativeness of these disclosures are diminished because of managers’ efforts to obfuscate 
tax strategies (Robinson and Schmidt, 2013) and because provisions within FIN 48 generally 
result in an overstatement of future tax cash outflows (Robinson et al., 2016). I document a 
diminished association between UTB reserves and future tax cash outflows in the presence of 
indemnified tax positions which suggests tax indemnification may partially explain the findings 
from prior studies. Moreover, my study readdresses and expands on the examination of UTB 
reserves from earlier studies. Many of the extant UTB reserve studies were performed around the 
initial implementation of FIN 48 with narrow time windows. Now that the FIN 48 regime has 
been in effect for more than a decade, Blouin and Robinson (2014) suggest that enough time has 
passed to readdress some of the issues examined in these early studies. This study contributes to 
the literature examining the long-standing effects of FIN 48.  
The remainder of my paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I present background 
information, review prior literature and develop my hypothesis. Section 3 discusses my research 
methodology and results. I present additional analyses in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                          
4 The FIN 48 guidance is now codified within ASC 740. 
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2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Tax Indemnification Insurance and Tax Indemnification Clauses 
Tax indemnification protects taxpayers from potential adverse outcomes of challenged 
tax positions. It is mainly provided in two forms: as an insurance product or as a clause within an 
M&A contract. Tax indemnification insurance has two main types: protection against the known 
(i.e., representations and warranties insurance) and protection against the unknown (i.e., tax 
indemnity insurance). Over the past decade, tax indemnification insurance has become more 
prevalent within the business world. AIG reports that it currently provides representations and 
warranties insurance for M&A deals valuing at least $700 billion and tax-related items are the 
second most common issue for which they pay claims.5 As for tax indemnity insurance, 
anecdotal evidence provided by phone interviews with key M&A consultants suggests that 
numerous providers have entered the market in the past decade causing a decline in premiums 
for these insurance products. The entry of new market participants and the decline of premiums 
have led to tax indemnification insurance being present more frequently in other aspects of 
business, such as facilitating capital raising and mitigating operating risk. Aon Transaction 
Solutions reports that coverage provided by their tax indemnification insurance product 
increased 500 percent over a span of three years; specifically, their coverage increased from $2.1 
billion in 2013 to $12.6 billion in 2016 (Rosen and Blitz, 2017).  The growing demand for tax 
indemnification insurance is expected to continue, which highlights the importance of 
understanding the implications of tax indemnification. 
                                                          
5 Per anecdotal evidence provided by interviews with key M&A consultants, they estimate that 50 to 60 percent of 




M&As contain many risks and are extremely complex (Karlinsky and Burton, 2011). In 
order to facilitate M&A deals, sellers frequently offer indemnification to protect acquirers from 
various risks associated with the target, including risks associated with prior tax positions 
(Logue, 2005). Though a clause differs from insurance in the sense that one is a contractual 
obligation and the other a product, both provide protection from uncertainties surrounding tax 
positions. Furthermore, outside parties can determine whether tax indemnification clauses are 
present if they have access to the M&A contracts. Tax indemnification is described in various 
ways in M&A contracts (i.e., it can be described as the indemnification of representations about 
tax matters, as holding the buyer harmless for taxes associated with pre-transaction periods or as 
holding the buyer harmless for “excluded liabilities” which may include taxes associated with 
pre-transaction periods).6 Though tax indemnification is described in many different ways, the 
end result is the same; the transfer of a contingent tax liability to an outside party. 
After the completion of an M&A, financial statement users should exercise caution in 
evaluating the acquirer’s UTB reserves when assuming tax indemnification is present. First, if a 
financial statement user establishes that tax indemnification is provided by the M&A contract, 
then it does not necessarily mean that the acquirer will report any uncertain tax positions 
associated with the M&A. In other words, an acquirer may be offered indemnification even 
though they are not acquiring any tax positions for which the target firm has recorded UTB 
reserves. Second, if an acquirer does report uncertain tax positions associated with the M&A, 
then it does not necessarily mean they are acquired tax positions. They may be tax positions 
generated as part of the M&A transaction itself and therefore not subject to indemnification. 
                                                          
6 Refer to Appendix B for specific examples of contract language. 
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These potential issues highlight the importance of requiring the separate disclosure of the 
components of acquisition-related UTB reserves. 
Tax Indemnification Accounting Under ASC 805 – Business Combinations 
In 2007, the FASB issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 141 (R), 
Business Combinations (which is now codified as ASC 805). ASC 805 addresses various aspects 
of business combinations, including how to record indemnified tax position liabilities. Within the 
context of business combinations, indemnified tax position liabilities are acquired contingent tax 
liabilities in which the seller has agreed to hold the acquirer harmless. ASC 805 requires mirror 
accounting for indemnified liabilities; specifically, ASC 805 states “the acquirer shall recognize 
an indemnification asset at the same time that it recognizes the indemnified item”.7 For an 
illustrative example, consider the accounting for a $100,000,000 indemnified tax position under 
ASC 805. Firm A acquires Subsidiary T from Firm S. Prior to the acquisition, Subsidiary T 
maintains a $100,000,000 UTB reserve for uncertain tax positions which are currently 
susceptible to authoritative challenges. To sweeten the deal, Firm S has agreed to indemnify 
Firm A for all taxes, interest and penalties associated with successful challenges to Subsidiary 
T’s uncertain tax positions. Though Firm S is contractually responsible for the uncertain tax 
positions, Firm A is still required, under ASC 805, to reflect Subsidiary T’s uncertain tax 
positions in its consolidated financial statements.8 Therefore, Firm A will account for the M&A 
as follows: 
(1) Other M&A Assets      $ ###,###,### 
 Tax Indemnification Asset     $ 100,000,000 
  UTB Reserve       $ 100,000,000 
  Other M&A Liabilities     $ ###,###,### 
  Consideration Paid for M&A     $ ###,###,### 
                                                          
7 See ASC 805-20-25-27. 
8 ASC 805-740-25-2 states “the acquirer … shall account for … any income tax uncertainties of an acquiree that 
exist at the acquisition date, or that arise as a result of the acquisition in, accordance with … [FIN 48]”. 
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Though the recognition of these indemnified tax positions increases Firm A’s assets and 
liabilities, Firm A will not experience any net effect to equity or income. 
  When the tax position is successfully challenged and a tax payment is due or when the 
statute of limitations expires for the tax position, the tax indemnification asset and UTB reserve 
associated with that position must be eliminated. Payouts for tax indemnification can occur in 
one of two ways. First, the indemnifying party may settle an indemnified tax position directly 
with the challenging tax authority. Second, the indemnifying party may reimburse the 
indemnified party for settlements paid to the challenging tax authority. In either case, the 
payment would result in a decrease to the indemnification asset and related liability. Let us return 
to the earlier example. Subsidiary T loses a challenge from a tax authority on the indemnified tax 
position. Firm A pays the settlement on behalf of Subsidiary T and submits a reimbursement 
request per the terms of the indemnification agreement with Firm S. Firm S approves the 
reimbursement request and submits the payment to Firm A. The entries are as follows: 
(2) UTB Reserve       $ 100,000,000 
  Cash        $ 100,000,000 
 
(3) Cash        $ 100,000,000 
  Tax Indemnification Asset     $ 100,000,000 
 
These entries result in the removal of the asset and liability representing the indemnified tax 
position without affecting Firm A’s equity or income. Though the utilization of tax 
indemnification results in no net effect to the acquirer’s net income when the settlement amount 
equals the UTB reserve, the same cannot be said about adjustments to tax indemnification 
accounts when there is no settlement or when the settlement does not equal the UTB reserve 
booked at acquisition. 
 The tax indemnification accounts may need to be adjusted without any actual cash flows 
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due to the expiration of statutes of limitations associated with indemnified positions or due to 
specific provisions within the M&A contract. Unlike other possible indemnified liabilities, the 
adjustment of indemnified tax liabilities results in changes to both pre-tax income and tax 
expense. When tax statutes expire, ASC 740 standards coupled with SEC regulations result in the 
recognition of a tax benefit without the ability to offset the recognized tax benefit with the 
reversal of the tax indemnification asset.9 Therefore, the tax indemnification asset must be 
adjusted through a pre-tax account while the UTB reserve must be adjusted through tax expense. 
In other words, the reversal of the original mirror accounting entry is not allowed. Now, return 
to the earlier example and assume the position was never challenged. After three years, the 
statute of limitations expires on the uncertain tax position taken by Subsidiary T. In response, 
Firm A removes the tax indemnification asset and associated UTB reserve from their financial 
records. Their entries are as follows: 
(4) UTB Reserve       $ 100,000,000 
  Tax Benefit       $ 100,000,000 
 
(5) Other Expense      $ 100,000,000 
  Tax Indemnification Asset     $ 100,000,000 
 
These entries result in the removal of the asset and liability representing the indemnified tax 
position without affecting Firm A’s equity or overall income. However, the above accounting 
does influence pre-tax income and tax expense, creating a permanent book-tax difference.10 This 
permanent book-tax difference is not required to be separately disclosed in the reconciliation to 
                                                          
9 ASC 740-10-25-8 requires the recognition of a benefit when the statute expires, while SEC Code of Federal 
Regulations §210.5 – 03 allows only “taxes based on income tax” to be reported under income tax expense. 
10 A similar difference is created if the firm has a settlement that is more or less than the booked UTB reserve. If the 
firm settled for more than the reserve and it was fully indemnified, the firm would record increases to the UTB 
reserve and a tax indemnification asset in the period in which it becomes evident that the reserve is not adequate per 
ASC 740-10-25-15. Per SEC regulations, mirror accounting is not allowed to adjust the reserve. Therefore, firms 
would record an increase to other income (to increase the indemnification asset) and tax expense (to record the 
higher settlement). 
12 
the statutory tax rate or elsewhere in the tax footnote, which is problematic for investors and 
researchers alike when evaluating the tax information in the financial statements. 
Potential Issues with Indemnification Disclosure and Accounting 
Under ASC 805, the accounting for the payment of an indemnified tax position results in 
no net effect on overall net income or equity for the indemnified acquirer. However, the 
inclusion of indemnified tax positions in the acquirer’s UTB reserves may reduce the 
informativeness of these reserves. Consider that ASC 740 requires UTB reserve liabilities to be 
separately disclosed and discussed, but neither ASC 740 nor ASC 805 require that the presence 
of indemnification be disclosed or discussed. Therefore, financial statement users may be unable 
to differentiate indemnified liabilities from “normal” liabilities.11 
Furthermore, there are disclosure issues when adjusting indemnified tax positions for 
fulfillment. Specifically, neither ASC 740 nor ASC 805 address how tax cash outflows 
associated with fulfillments should be disclosed in cash taxes paid on the cash flow statement, 
which results in two different disclosure scenarios. In scenario one, the indemnified party nets 
out the effect of taxes paid reflecting that the indemnified party did not pay the taxes. In scenario 
two, the indemnified party reflects the payment to the taxing authority in cash taxes paid. Both 
scenarios have issues. In scenario one, the exclusion of the payment from cash taxes paid reduces 
the informativeness of UTB reserves; specifically, the UTB reserve is not informative about 
future cash outflows surrounding the indemnified uncertain tax position. In scenario two, the 
reflection of taxes paid by an outside party distorts tax cash outflows and cash ETRs; 
specifically, cash taxes paid are overstated which results in the cash ETR being overstated. In 
other words, current disclosure requirements (or lack thereof) may hinder ASC 740’s original 
                                                          
11 The disclosure of indemnified tax positions is allowable and therefore a firm may choose to voluntarily disclose 
this information. Per my review of income tax disclosures, the norm is not to disclose this information. 
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purpose of UTB reserves providing information about potential future tax cash outflows. 
 In addition, the accounting guidance for adjusting indemnified tax positions when there is 
no equivalent cash settlement also potentially results in a distortion of a firm’s GAAP and cash 
ETRs. Specifically, any adjustments to the UTB reserve must be adjusted through tax expense 
while any adjustments to the tax indemnification asset must be adjusted through a pre-tax 
account. Therefore, the adjustment of indemnified tax positions results in GAAP ETRs being 
understated and cash ETRs being overstated. Let us return to the earlier example of Firm A 
removing their expired indemnified tax position. Prior to removing the UTB reserves associated 
with the indemnified tax position, Firm A’s consolidated financial statements reflected pretax 
book income of $2,500 million, GAAP tax expense of $525 million, and cash taxes paid of $525 
million, which results in GAAP and cash ETRs of 21.00 percent. By removing the $100 million 
UTB reserve and the $100 million tax indemnification asset, Firm A’s consolidated financial 
statements reflect GAAP tax expense of $425 million (decreased), cash outflows related to 
income tax of $525 million (unchanged) and pretax book income of $2,400 (decreased), which 
results in a GAAP ETR of 17.71 percent and a cash ETR of 21.88 percent. Therefore, the GAAP 
ETR is understated and the cash ETR is overstated. 
Prior Research on Tax Indemnification 
To my knowledge, no prior studies have examined the impact of tax indemnification on 
the informativeness of UTB reserves. However, two papers have discussed the tax 
indemnification insurance market (Logue, 2005; Wolfe, 2011). Logue (2005) discusses the 
emergence of the market for tax indemnification insurance and potential hazards of these 
emerging markets. Specifically, Logue discusses the possibility of tax indemnification insurance 
for legal uncertainty becoming insurance for detection uncertainty. If tax indemnification 
14 
insurance becomes synonymous with detection insurance, then Logue warns that tax authorities 
may see a rise in tax sheltering. However, various insurance providers, such as AON Transaction 
Solutions, state that tax shelters are uninsurable.12 Wolfe (2011) discusses the many uses of tax 
indemnification insurance. For instance, Wolfe points out that firms are increasingly using tax 
indemnification insurance to facilitate capital raising and lower operating risk in addition to its 
traditional use of facilitating M&As. Furthermore, he discusses the complexities of determining 
the deductibility and taxability of payments sent and received under tax indemnification 
insurance policies. He suggests that there is not one clear path to make these determinations and 
that all facts must be considered. As for this study, contracts normally specify that the receipt of 
any indemnification payments under an indemnification clause will be accounted for as an 
adjustment to the M&A purchase price and/or the basis of the acquired assets for tax purposes. 
Tax indemnification insurance is similar to tax indemnification clauses in that both 
transfer tax risk to a third party. In both cases, the indemnified party would be required to report 
the indemnified tax positions as liabilities under ASC 740 with a corresponding asset on the 
balance sheet. A key difference is that tax indemnification insurance would have a purchase 
price from a third-party insurer, while tax indemnification clauses would be valued into the 
contract price. To my knowledge, there are no empirical studies on tax indemnification insurance 
or tax indemnification clauses. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) recognized this gap in the literature 
and called for research on tax indemnification insurance; specifically, they call for research into 
the frequency of tax indemnification insurance and how this insurance is priced. My study is a 
first step toward filling this gap in the literature. 
                                                          
12 See https://www.aon.com/attachments/risk-services/afs/FIN-48-FAQs.pdf. 
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Prior Research on Tax Reserves 
In 2007, the FASB issued FIN 48 (later codified under ASC 740) to facilitate the 
comparability of financial statements and standardize tax reserve reporting. Prior to 
standardization, the need for a tax reserve was evaluated as a contingent loss under FASB’s 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards, No 5. The contingency-based approach required 
the recognition of possible tax liabilities when they were likely to be challenged and when they 
could be reasonably estimated; both conditions were subject to significant amounts of managerial 
discretion.  
Studies of the pre-FIN 48 era conclude that disclosures about tax reserves were often 
inadequate for assessing tax uncertainties (Gleason and Mills, 2002; Dhaliwal, Gleason, and 
Mills, 2004; Gupta, Laux, and Lynch, 2016). Gleason and Mills (2002) find that a significant 
number of firms did not report contingent tax liabilities even when the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) indicated that material claims against the company were pending. Firms tended to wait 
until the claims were near absolute before recording them, which suggests tax reserves were 
often materially understated. Dhaliwal et al. (2004) investigate firms that regularly reported tax 
reserves prior to FIN 48. Utilizing tax return data, they find evidence that tax expense was used 
to manage earnings when pre-tax manipulation options were not enough to meet earnings 
expectations, which suggests these firms maintained overstated tax reserves, commonly referred 
to as “cookie jar” tax reserves. Gleason and Mills (2008) and Gupta et al. (2016) document that 
investors do not punish firms for manipulating tax reserves to meet expectations as much as they 
punish firms that miss earnings expectations. Therefore, firms are incentivized to manipulate tax 
reserves to meet analyst expectations. Collectively, these academic findings suggest that there 
was minimal consistency in tax reserve reporting prior to FIN 48, which hindered the 
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informativeness of tax disclosures. 
The SEC noticed these diverse reporting practices and informed the FASB of their 
discovery (FASB, 2012). What followed was an intense debate between the public (i.e., tax 
directors, tax attorneys, and certified public accounting firms) and the FASB on the 
standardization of tax reserve reporting. The public voiced concerns that authorities would utilize 
standardized tax reserve reporting to identify and subsequently punish firms for tax avoidance 
(Leone, 2007). However, the FASB argued that, without standards, financial statement users 
would struggle with assessing future tax cash outflows amongst companies. In the end, the FASB 
issued standards on the reporting of uncertain tax positions described within FIN 48. Under FIN 
48, firms assess the likelihood of successfully defending authoritative challenges of uncertain tax 
positions. In determining this likelihood, they assume that positions will be challenged and that 
the challenging authority will have access to all private information regarding the positions. If 
the firm determines that an uncertain tax position will “more-likely-than-not” be successfully 
defended, then they assess the associated benefits using a benefit-recognition approach. Any 
benefits that are associated with positions failing to meet the “more-likely-than-not” threshold 
are recorded as contingent liabilities. 
Blouin, Gleason, Mills and Sikes (2010) document that firms substantially decreased 
their tax reserves in the quarters leading up to FIN 48’s implementation. They suggest that these 
firms may have underreported or settled weak uncertain tax positions to minimize external 
scrutiny of these positions. However, the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) later reported 
that the average firm made minimal, if any, changes to tax strategies. Blouin et al. (2010) also 
suggest that firms may have engaged in earnings management to get an immediate earnings 
benefit. Firms with “cookie jar” tax reserves would have forfeited earnings benefits associated 
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with tax reserves after the implementation of FIN 48.13 Therefore, firms had incentives to utilize 
their “cookie jar” tax reserves prior to the implementation of FIN 48.  
In 2012, the FAF utilized the implementation of FIN 48 to perform an initial test run of 
their Post-Implementation Review (PIR) process (Blouin and Robinson, 2014). The primary 
objectives of the FAF’s PIR was “(1) to determine whether FIN 48 is accomplishing its stated 
purpose, (2) to evaluate FIN 48’s implementation and continuing compliance costs and related 
benefits, and (3) to provide recommendations to improve the FASB’s standard-setting process” 
(FAF 2012, p. 1). The FAF concluded that more information is being disclosed under FIN 48, 
but FIN 48 may not have improved the comparability or predictive value of said information. 
Moreover, the FAF’s PIR report indicates that “preparers and practitioners generally do not 
believe that FIN 48 resolves the issues underlying the need for the standard. Therefore, 
generally, they do not believe the costs of applying FIN 48 are reasonable compared to its 
benefits” (FAF 2012, p. 9). Even with these concerns, the FAF concluded that the benefits of 
FIN 48 outweighed the compliance costs. The FASB agreed that firms are providing more 
information about uncertain tax positions but largely ignored the remainder of the FAF’s 
findings (FASB, 2012). The FASB’s response to the FAF’s report stated: “because the findings 
in the Report indicate that overall, FIN 48 has improved the consistency, comparability and 
relevance of information about uncertain tax positions, and that those benefits outweigh the 
related costs, the FASB does not plan to undertake a separate project to review FIN 48 at this 
time” (FASB 2012, p. 2). Although the FASB and the FAF concur that FIN 48 improved the 
consistency of tax reserve reporting, their conclusions differ regarding increased comparability 
                                                          
13 Lowering UTB reserves to actual levels prior to FIN 48 resulted in increases to earnings. If firms waited until FIN 
48’s implementation date and properly recorded UTBs, lowering UTB reserves would have resulted in changes to 
equity. 
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and relevance. The FASB suggests that by providing more information about tax positions, the 
relevance and comparability of tax disclosures increased, while the FAF question these 
conclusions. In addition, Gupta et al. (2016) suggest that the removal of management discretion 
under FIN 48 curtailed some earnings management within tax reserves.14  
Though the FAF appears to be a proponent of FIN 48, they suggest that the valuation 
approach required by FIN 48 may hinder its ability to increase the comparability and relevance 
of tax disclosures. In addition, Robinson et al. (2016) and Cazier, Rego, Tian and Wilson (2015) 
both suggest that certain provisions within FIN 48 hinder its ability to increase the comparability 
and relevance of UTB reserves; specifically, they refer to provisions removing the ability to 
consider detection risk and offset varying tax positions. Other academics suggest that the 
reporting discretion allowed under FIN 48 can create substantial variation in reporting similar 
positions, which further hinders its ability to increase informativeness (Robinson and Schmidt, 
2013; De Simone, Robinson and Stomberg, 2014). Robinson and Schmidt (2013) suggest that the 
ambiguity of FIN 48 may lead to differences in uncertain tax position reporting even when given 
the same criteria. To illustrate this point, they demonstrate how a properly identified UTB 
reserve can be correctly reported 14 different ways under FIN 48. In line with this illustration, 
De Simone et al. (2014) document that UTB reserves are not uniformly reported by firms within 
the same industry for similar uncertain tax positions. Specifically, they document substantial 
variation amongst 19 paper companies in the reporting of a refundable excise tax.  
The purpose of FIN 48 was to improve the comparability and relevance of tax reserve 
disclosures to improve capital allocation within the market, i.e., to aid investors in decision-
                                                          
14 It is important to note that FIN 48 did remove some managerial discretion from the UTB recognition and 
derecognition processes. However, FIN 48 did not remove all managerial discretion, nor did it make the application 
of tax law simpler. These aspects of FIN 48 may contribute to the lack of uniformity in tax reporting. As Dhaliwal et 
al. (2004) suggests, it is difficult to disentangle earnings management from tax complexities.  
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making. Contrary to expectations, academics suggest that investors tend to reward firms for low 
disclosure quality of uncertain tax positions. Robinson and Schmidt (2013) document substantial 
variation in the implementation of FIN 48; specifically, they find that approximately 40 percent 
of firms did not disclose forward looking information and compliant firms tended to use 
ambiguous language. They suggest that disclosing unchallenged, aggressive tax positions can 
hurt a company’s competitive advantage and investors reward firms for obfuscating such 
strategies, especially when proprietary costs are high. Due to the discretion, variation and 
obfuscation associated with FIN 48, it is unclear whether FIN 48 could curtail the use of tax 
reserves to manage earnings. In fact, Cazier et al. (2015) and Gleason et al. (2018) document 
earnings management within tax reserves in the post-FIN 48 era.  
In addition to the above concerns about FIN 48, many tax managers feared that 
authorities would use these disclosures to target tax-aggressive firms. Supporting this view, 
Bozanic, Hoopes, Thornock and Williams (2017) document that the IRS responded to FIN 48 by 
significantly increasing its downloads of 10-ks and that this increased attention from the IRS was 
greater for firms that reported larger UTB reserves. They suggest this increased attention by the 
IRS indicates that the IRS used these disclosures to identify tax-aggressive firms and justify the 
Schedule UTP requirement.  
The IRS introduced Schedule UTP in 2010 to obtain more information regarding 
uncertain tax positions reported for financial purposes; specifically, Schedule UTP requires the 
disclosure of uncertain tax positions taken on U.S. federal tax returns which require a UTB 
reserve or would have required a reserve but the reporting firm did not record the reserve due to 
expectations of future litigation. Furthermore, the reporting firm must rank these positions by 
size and describe the positions taken (Internal Revenue Service, 2018). The IRS justified the 
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additional disclosure by referencing current FIN 48 disclosure requirements and stating that more 
precise information “would aid the Service in focusing its examination resources”.15 In the wake 
of these new requirements, several academic studies examined company responses to the 
implementation of Schedule UTP (Honaker and Sharma, 2017; Gleason et al., 2018; Bozanic et 
al., 2017). Honaker and Sharma (2017) find that firms reduced UTB reserves after the 
implementation of schedule UTP while maintaining consistent cash ETRs. They interpret their 
results as firms reducing disclosures without changing their tax avoidance strategies to reduce 
IRS scrutiny. Gleason et al. (2018) document that the implementation of Schedule UTP did not 
on average have a noticeable effect on accrual quality but did increase UTB reserve 
comparability of firms utilizing similar levels of auditor-provided tax services. Lastly, Bozanic et 
al. (2017) find that the IRS shifted their use of public FIN 48 disclosures to private Schedule 
UTP disclosures. 
Most relevant to my study, various academic studies have explored whether UTB 
reserves are informative about future tax outcomes (Guenther et al., 2017; Robinson et al., 2016; 
Hanlon et al., 2018; Ciconte et al., 2016: Nesbitt, 2014). Guenther et al. (2017) find that UTB 
reserves, predicted using Rego and Wilson’s (2012) UTB reserve model, are not associated with 
the volatility of future cash ETRs. Robinson et al. (2016) find that FIN 48 reduced the ability of 
tax accounts to predict future tax cash outflows. In contrast, Hanlon et al. (2018), Ciconte et al. 
(2016) and Nesbitt (2014) suggest that UTB reserves are informative about future tax cash 
outflows. Hanlon et al. (2018) and Ciconte et al. (2016) find that UTB reserves are positively 
associated with future tax cash outflows. Nesbitt (2014) finds that the non-discretionary portion 
of UTB reserves is positively associated with future taxes paid but the discretionary portion has 
                                                          
15 See IRS ANN 2010-09, released on January 26, 2010.  
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no association with future taxes paid. 
Academics have suggested that reporting risk preferences (Lisowsky, Robinson, and 
Schmidt, 2013; Gleason et al., 2018), incentives to obfuscate tax strategies (FAF, 2012; Bozanic 
et al., 2017), variations in managerial discretion (FAF, 2012; Abernathy, Beyer, Gross, and 
Rapley, 2017) and complexities in tax law may lead to substantial variation in the 
informativeness of UTB reserves (FAF, 2012). I examine whether the presence of indemnified 
tax positions also hinders the informativeness of UTB reserves.16 I fill a gap in prior literature by 
specifically addressing the impact of tax indemnification on the association between UTB 
reserves and future tax cash outflows. 
Development of Hypothesis 
UTB reserves are reserves for uncertain tax positions that may result in future tax cash 
outflows. These uncertain tax positions do not meet the more-likely-than-not standard, meaning 
there is a significant probability that they will not be upheld if the firm is audited by the relevant 
tax authorities. Tax authorities have access to the firm’s financial statements, including uncertain 
tax position disclosures, which may influence their decision to audit the firm. Consistent with 
this reasoning, Bozanic et al. (2017) document that the level of UTB reserves is positively 
associated with the amount of attention paid to SEC filings by tax authorities.17 Thus, firms with 
higher UTB reserves are more likely to be audited by tax authorities and those authorities are 
likely to focus on uncertain tax positions underlying UTB reserves. As tax audits for the current 
                                                          
16 It is important to note that of these prior studies, only the Hanlon et al. (2018) study considers M&A activity in 
their models. However, they use acquisition costs only as a predictor of cash holdings and do not consider whether 
M&As impact the association between current UTB reserves and future tax cash outflows.  
17 This increase in authoritative attention is highlighted by prepared remarks of Steven T. Miller, IRS Deputy 
Commissioner, on March 12, 2012. “And we continue to see the possibility of compliance risk in the large taxpayer 
community.  According to SEC data, LB&I taxpayers are reporting large reserves due to uncertain positions as 
Unrealized Tax Benefits.  Although we can’t tell whether these reserves relate to federal, foreign or state tax 
uncertainties, we need to pay attention to them”. 
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and prior years are settled in the future, the firm is likely to pay more in taxes, interest, and 
penalties. Therefore, current UTB reserves should be useful for estimating future tax cash 
outflows. Consistent with this reasoning, Robinson et al. (2016) document that a portion of these 
reserves result in cash outflows; specifically, they document that 24 (48) cents of every dollar 
reserved for uncertain tax positions results in tax cash outflows within three (five) years. In 
addition, Hanlon et al. (2018), Ciconte et al. (2016) and Nesbitt (2014) document that UTB 
reserves are positively associated with future tax cash outflows. In line with these prior studies, I 
expect UTB reserves to be positively associated with future tax cash outflows when firms’ 
uncertain tax positions are not indemnified. 
However, the presence of uncertain tax positions that have been indemnified may 
moderate the positive association between current UTB reserves and future tax cash outflows. 
An indemnified tax position that is successfully challenged results in a net cash outflow for the 
indemnifier. However, the indemnified party, which reflects the indemnified uncertain tax 
position, would experience minimal, if any, cash outflows. Therefore, financial statement users 
should consider the presence of indemnified tax positions when assessing UTB reserves.  
The practice of offering indemnification to acquirers is commonly used by sellers to 
facilitate M&As. Though the indemnified tax position is not the responsibility of the acquirer, 
the acquirer in an M&A is responsible under ASC 805-740-25-2 to report uncertain tax positions 
associated with the transaction. In line with this standard, Lisowsky et al. (2013) document a 
positive association between the presence of M&As and levels of UTB reserves. Furthermore, 
using confidential IRS data, Towery (2017) analyzes the composition of items reported by U.S. 
firms on the 2010 Schedule UTP. She reports that a significant component of uncertain tax 
positions relates to M&As. Therefore, the mere presence of an M&A may significantly increase 
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the level of UTB reserves. However, the presence of an indemnification clause would effectively 
transfer the responsibility of the contingency to the indemnifier. This transfer of responsibility 
would reduce the usefulness of the acquirer’s UTB reserves for assessing future tax cash 
outflows, especially if the acquirer records indemnified tax positions within their UTB reserves. 
For this reason, I expect that the association between current UTB reserves and future tax cash 
outflows to vary between firms which report indemnified tax positions and those that do not. In 
line with this reasoning, my hypothesis is formally stated as follows: 
H1: For firms engaging in an M&A transaction, the association between UTB 
reserves and future tax cash outflows is less positive for firms that have 
indemnified uncertain tax positions than for those that do not. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL METHOD AND RESULTS 
Methodology 
The focus of this study is whether the association between current UTB reserves and 
future tax cash outflows varies in the presence of indemnified tax positions. To explore whether 
this variation exists amongst firms obtaining uncertain tax positions from M&As, I perform 
seemingly unrelated estimations to test for differences in the coefficients of the following models 
for firms without indemnification and those with indemnification:18 
M&A Firm-Years Without Indemnification: 
FUT_TXPDt+4 = β0 + β1 UTBt + β2 CONSt + β3 NOLCFt + β4 TXPDt  
+ β5 ∆_TXPDt + β6 ∆_PTBIt + β7 DTXt + εt  (1a) 
 
                                                          
18 Univariate tests indicate that the correlations between the control variables and the dependent variable differs 
across the two subsamples of contracts; therefore, these variables should be allowed to vary across the subsamples. 
When controls need to vary across subsamples, the use of interaction models or seemingly unrelated estimations can 
accomplish this and test for differences. Both methods may be interpreted similarly. However, seemingly unrelated 
estimations allow for simpler modeling. For instance, an interaction model in my case would require a total of 15 
variables, while seemingly unrelated estimations require only 7 variables which is ideal when dealing with small 
samples. To provide comfort that the main conclusions are not a product of design choice, I later perform robustness 
tests using an interaction model approach and find similar inferences. 
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M&A Firm-Years With Indemnification: 
FUT_TXPDt+4 = α0 +α1 UTBt + α2 CONSt + α3 NOLCFt + α4 TXPDt  
+ α5 ∆_TXPDt + α6 ∆_PTBIt + α7 DTXt + γt  (1b) 
 
Beta, β, represents coefficients for firms without indemnification and alpha, α, represents 
coefficients for firms with indemnification. FUT_TXPDt+4 represents my measure of future tax 
cash outflows; specifically, it is the log of the ratio of cumulative tax cash outflows over years 
t+1 through t+4 to ending total assets in year t.19 UTBt is my variable of interest and represents 
UTB reserves scaled by ending total assets in year t. In line with prior research, I expect that 
UTBt will have a positive association with FUT_TXPDt+4 (β1 > 0) for firms without indemnified 
tax positions. However, I expect that firms with indemnified tax positions will have a lower 
association or no association between UTBt and FUT_TXPDt+4 (β1 > α1).  CONSt is the ratio of 
total M&A consideration value reported within the observation’s 10-k to ending total assets in 
year t.20 Consideration paid during an M&A can provide substantial future tax benefits to the 
acquiror through additional cost recovery deductions. As consideration paid becomes a larger 
component of ending assets, acquirors should experience larger immediate reductions in future 
tax cash outflows. Therefore, I predict a negative association between CONSt and future tax cash 
outflows. 
NOLCFt is the ratio of net operating loss (NOL) carryforwards scaled by ending total 
assets in year t. NOL carryforwards can offset future taxable income and should result in 
reductions to future tax cash outflows. Therefore, NOLCFt is predicted to have a negative 
                                                          
19 A plot of the residuals from an unlogged dependent variable regression indicated that the residuals were not 
random which is a violation of ordinary least squares assumptions. This lack of randomness is likely due to the 
unlogged dependent variable being constrained at zero. To address this issue, I logged the dependent variable then 
reperform the regression. A plot of the error terms after this transformation indicates that the residuals are now 
random. 
20 I hand-collected the consideration paid amount from the observation’s associated 10-k disclosures.  
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association with future tax cash outflows. TXPDt is the ratio of taxes paid to ending total assets in 
year t, while ∆_TXPDt is the difference in taxes paid in year t-1 to year t, scaled by ending total 
assets in year t. Consistent with prior research, I expect a positive coefficient for TXPDt and a 
negative coefficient for ∆_TXPDt. ∆_PTBIt is the difference in pretax book income in year t-1 to 
year t, scaled by ending total assets in year t. Due to the stickiness of earnings, increases in 
taxable income should result in persistent increases to future tax cash outflows. Therefore, I 
predict a positive association between changes in pretax book income and future tax cash 
outflows. DTXt is the ratio of net deferred taxes scaled by ending total assets in year t. 
Specifically, it is net deferred tax assets (liabilities) reduced by the portion of UTB reserves 
related to timing uncertainties or temporary book tax differences.21 Deferred tax assets 
(liabilities) should be indicative of reductions (additions) to future tax cash outflows and 
therefore should have a negative association with future tax cash outflows.  The definitions of all 
variables are summarized in Appendix A. All models cluster errors by firm and include year 
fixed effects.  
Models (1a) and (1b) are similar to the model used in Hanlon et al. (2018) with two 
modifications. I utilize a four-year window for the dependent variable, FUT_TXPDt, instead of 
the five-year window utilized in Hanlon et al. (2018) for two reasons. The first reason is that the 
statute of limitations for U.S. federal income tax returns is generally three years beginning on the 
date the return is filed. Therefore, a position taken in year t is generally subject to scrutiny for up 
to four years, the year of filing, year t+1, through the expiration of the statute, year t+4. In 
addition, using only four years prevents a significant reduction in my sample size.  I also include 
                                                          
21 The adjustment to deferred tax assets is consistent with Hanlon et al. (2018). To ensure that results are not due to 
this design choice, I later perform a robustness test with an unadjusted deferred tax assets (liabilities) control and 
find similar inferences.  
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an additional control variable, CONSt, because future taxes paid may be reduced for future tax 
deductions that are increasing with the consideration paid in an M&A, as discussed above. 
Sample Selection 
To explore the implications of reporting indemnified tax positions, I begin by identifying 
a pool of firm-year observations for which M&A contracts may be available on the SEC’s Edgar 
database. Specifically, I merge all firm-years available in the Compustat North America database 
from the years 2008 thru 2013 that have more than $1,000,000 in total assets with data from the 
Thomson SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database, which results in 46,447 firm-year 
observations from 10,954 public firms.22 I remove observations with total assets less than a 
$1,000,000 to avoid issues with small denominators in my calculations. Due to differences in 
taxation and accounting standards, I remove all real estate investment trusts (REITs) and foreign 
filers from my potential contract sample which results in 31,242 firm-year observations from 
7,244 firms. In line with Hanlon et al. (2018), I remove all observations with negative total assets 
and negative total sales which results in 31,217 firm-year observations from 7,241 firms. I 
remove observations that do not have all necessary data items available to compute the model 
variables, which results in 8,567 firm-year observations from 2,237 firms.  
I then remove all observations which did not complete an M&A during the observation 
firm-year which results in 2,630 firm-year observations from 1,065 firms.  To reduce the 
confounding effects of multiple M&A contracts with varying terms during the same fiscal year, I 
remove all observations with more than one completed M&A during the observation firm-year. 
The final pool of observations for which M&A contracts may be available consists of 1,320 firm-
                                                          
22 Blouin et al. (2010) document preemptive removal and reestablishment of tax reserves around the implementation 
of FIN 48, effectively contaminating UTB reserves in 2006 and 2007. Therefore, I begin my study in 2008 to avoid 
any contamination from this documented behavior.  Though the period of interest ends in 2013, I obtain data 
through 2017 to calculate four years of cumulative future tax cash outflows.  
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year observations from 846 firms. 
Using this pool of firm-years, I attempt to locate the M&A contract associated with the 
completed M&A by manually searching 8-Ks, 10-Qs, and 10-Ks filed by the firm and by using 
Seek INF, an EDGAR search tool provided by Seek EDGAR. Of the 1,320 firm-year observations, 
326 firms filed 375 M&A contracts (28.41 percent of potential contracts were located). Many 
contracts are not available because the firm determines a contract is not material under SEC 
Regulation S-K and, therefore, the firm is not required to file the contract or the firm may request 
that a filed contract remain confidential. However even if a contract is not required to be filed, 
management may choose to voluntarily file the contract with the SEC. After reviewing the  
Table 1: Sample Selection 
   
   
      Firms Observations 
        
Total public company observations with more than 
$1,000,000 in total assets from 2008 thru 2013 10,954 46,447 
   
     Less observations from REITs and foreign filers (3,710) (15,205) 
     Less observations with negative total assets or sales (3) (25) 
     Less observations without all model variables (5,004) (22,650) 
          Full Sample with model variables 2,237 8,567 
   
     Less observations without current-year M&As  (1,172) (5,937) 
     Less observations with multiple current-year M&As (219) (1,310) 
          Potential Contract Pool 846 1,320 
        
     Less observations without filed M&A contracts (520) (945) 
     Less observations without necessary contract detail          (19)        (20) 
          Final Contract Sample            307           355  
   
     Less observations without disclosures that UTB reserves        
     were added due to M&As          (260)        (304) 
          Reduced Contract Sample            47           51  
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available M&A contracts, I remove 20 contracts from 19 firms because the contracts do not 
disclose the seller’s representations about the target or whether indemnification was provided by 
the seller. The final sample of M&A contracts consists of 355 firm-year observations (contracts) 
from 307 firms. 
In addition to tests which utilize this final sample, tests are performed using various 
subsamples within this final sample. These subsamples include 223 observations from 202 firms 
which report increases to UTB reserves due to M&As and prior tax positions, 168 observations 
from 155 firms which report increases to UTB reserves due to M&As and prior tax positions but 
omitting firms with asset purchase contracts, and 51 observations from 47 firms which specifically 
report increases to UTB reserves due to M&As. The smallest subsample used in these regressions 
is referred to as the reduced sample in Table 1 and represents firms which generated or acquired 
uncertain tax positions due to an M&A and reported it separately in their note disclosure for income 
taxes.  
Indemnification Language in M&A Contracts 
Indemnification and tax matters sections of obtained M&A contracts were examined 
carefully to identify tax indemnification clauses. A thorough search of these contracts revealed 
that tax indemnification is described in various ways. For instance, refer to the language included 
in Appendix B for the stock purchase agreement between Forward Air Corporation, TQI 
Holdings, Inc., and various sellers. The sellers disclose within the tax matters section that “Each 
Entity has filed … all … material Tax Returns ... All such Tax Returns were correct and 
complete in all material respects. All Taxes owed by the Entities … have been paid”. In other 
words, the seller represents that all taxes associated with the target were done properly and paid. 
Later in the tax matters section, the sellers agree that “the Sellers shall … indemnify the Entities 
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and Buyer … against, and protect, save and hold harmless each Indemnified Taxpayer from, any 
and all [Losses] resulting from: (i) except to the extent reflected in the calculation of Closing 
Date Working Capital, any Taxes of any Entity allocable to any period ending on or prior to the 
Closing Date … (iv) any misrepresentation or breach of any representation, warranty or 
obligation set forth in this [section]”. Simply put, if the sellers misrepresented something to the 
buyer and it results in a loss, then the sellers would make the buyer whole again.  
Comparing the above stock purchase agreement language to the asset purchase agreement 
language between Depomed and Xanodyne Pharmaceuticals, little overlap exists between the 
languages used in these two contracts. However, both contracts provide tax indemnification to 
the buyer. Furthermore, the asset purchase agreement specifically addresses taxes associated 
with pre-closing periods (very straightforward language) and excluded liabilities (ambiguous 
language). Further investigation of this language shows that excluded liabilities in the context of 
this contract include all tax liabilities associated with pre-closing periods. The separation of this 
language is common among asset purchase contracts and requires that outside users determine 
what the language is referring to.  
Of the 355 contracts, 215 included separate discussions of indemnification which 
specifically address taxes. Per interviews with key M&A consultants, the indemnification of tax 
representations normally protects the buyer against all tax losses associated with past positions 
including complex issues such as transfer pricing. Therefore, I concentrate on the 
indemnification of tax representations instead of specific tax indemnification clauses.  
Contracts which do not provide indemnification can be easy or very difficult to identify. 
In an easy case, the contract will specify that any representations about the target will not survive 
the closing. For instance, refer to the agreement and plan of merger between Visa and 
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Cybersource. Cybersource states within the “General Provisions” section that “The 
representations and warranties of the Company, Parent and Merger Sub contained in this 
Agreement… shall terminate at the Effective Time [of the M&A]”. In other words, any 
misrepresentation of the target which results in a loss for Visa will not be reimbursed by 
Cybersource, unless Cybersource was fraudulent in their representations or a separate agreement 
exists within the contract which bypasses this language. When this language is not present, an 
outside party would have to review a significant portion of the contract to determine whether 
indemnification is present. Refer to Appendix B for contract excerpts. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2 presents various descriptive statistics on the presence of indemnification clauses 
within the 355 hand-collected contracts. The contracts consist of 121 merger contracts, 105 asset 
purchase contracts, and 129 interest purchase contracts.23 Of the 355 contracts, 282 contracts 
provide tax indemnification to the acquirer through the indemnification of tax representations 
provided by the seller about the target; specifically, 79.43 percent of the buyers in the contract 
sample are indemnified by the seller from losses associated with tax misrepresentations. 
Furthermore, 162 of those 282 contracts require escrow accounts to be maintained to secure 
possible indemnification claims.  
Of the three types of contracts, 52.89 percent of merger contracts, 92.38 percent of asset 
purchase contracts, and 93.80 percent of interest purchase contacts provide tax indemnification. 
Furthermore, Table 2 reflects that as M&A deals become larger, it is less likely for tax 
indemnification to be present; specifically, 88.65 percent of M&A deals valued at less than $100 
million have tax indemnification clauses, while 37.14 percent of M&A deals valued at over $1 
                                                          
23 Interest purchase contracts refer to stock purchase contracts, partnership interest purchase contracts, and equity 
interest purchase contracts.  
31 
billion have tax indemnification clauses. Lastly, descriptive statistics suggest that approximately 
93.88 percent of M&A deals in which the target is a subsidiary or a private company have tax 
indemnification. However, it appears that when one public company absorbs another public 
company, tax indemnification is normally not present; specifically, none of the public target 
contracts in my sample provide tax indemnification.24 
Table 2:  Contract Indemnification Composition 
 
This table presents the indemnification characteristics of hand-collected M&A contracts. 
 





Indemnification 282 73 355 79.43 % 
Escrow 162 120 282 57.45 % 








Merger 64 57 121 52.89 % 
Asset Purchase 97 8 105 92.38 % 
Interest Purchase 121 8 129 93.80 % 
    282 73 355 79.43 % 
Consideration  
(in Millions)       
 
0 < $ < 100 164 21 185 88.65 % 
100 ≤ $ < 250 58 10 68 85.29 % 
250 ≤ $ < 500 29 7 36 80.56 % 
500 ≤ $ < 1,000 18 13 31 58.06 % 
1,000 ≤ $ 13 22 35 37.14 % 
    282 73 355 79.43 % 
Target Status        
Publicly-Held 0 54 54 0.00 % 
Subsidiary 131 8 139 94.24 % 
Privately-Held 145 10 155 93.55 % 
Joint Venture 6 1 7 85.71 % 
    282 73 355 79.43 % 
 
                                                          
24 This finding is supported by anecdotal evidence obtained from interviews with key M&A consultants, who 
suggest tax indemnification clauses are almost never present in public-to-public mergers.  
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Table 2:  Contract Indemnification Composition (Cont.) 







Business Services 36 14 50 72.00 % 
Electronic Equipment 27 9 36 75.00 % 
Computers 16 3 19 84.21 % 
Medical Equipment 14 3 17 82.35 % 
Retail 11 6 17 64.71 % 
Pharmaceutical Products 7 9 16 43.75 % 
Wholesale 16 0 16 100.00 % 
Trading 13 1 14 92.86 % 
Measuring and Control Equip. 12 1 13 92.31 % 
Communication 10 2 12 83.33 % 
Automobiles and Trucks 9 1 10 90.00 % 
Business Supplies 8 2 10 80.00 % 
Machinery 10 0 10 100.00 % 
Chemicals 6 3 9 66.67 % 
Steel Works 9 0 9 100.00 % 
Consumer Goods 6 1 7 85.71 % 
Electrical Equipment 7 0 7 100.00 % 
Entertainment 7 0 7 100.00 % 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 4 3 7 57.14 % 
Food Products 6 0 6 100.00 % 
Apparel 5 0 5 100.00 % 
Construction Materials 5 0 5 100.00 % 
Healthcare 4 1 5 80.00 % 
Other 2 3 5 40.00 % 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 5 0 5 100.00 % 
Transportation 4 1 5 80.00 % 
Construction 4 0 4 100.00 % 
Personal Services 2 2 4 50.00 % 
Rubber and Plastic Products 4 0 4 100.00 % 
Textiles 2 2 4 50.00 % 
Banking 3 0 3 100.00 % 
Insurance 1 2 3 33.33 % 
Aircraft 1 1 2 50.00 % 
Printing and Publishing 1 1 2 50.00 % 
Recreation 2 0 2 100.00 % 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equip. 2 0 2 100.00 % 
Fabricated Products 1 0 1 100.00 % 
Tobacco Products 0 1 1 0.00 % 
Utilities 0 1 1 0.00 % 
    282 73 355 79.43 % 
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Of the potential 48 Fama-French industry classifications, 39 industries are present in my 
contract sample.25 Approximately 30 percent of my contract sample are from the business 
service, electronic equipment, and computer industries, while less than one percent of my 
contract sample are from the fabricated product, tobacco product, and utility industries. The 
business service, electronic equipment, and computer industries have indemnification 
frequencies of 72.00 percent, 75.00 percent, and 84.21 percent, respectively. While focusing on  
industries which are represented in my sample by more than 10 contracts, I find that the 
wholesale industry has the highest frequency of tax indemnification clauses (100.00 percent), 
while the pharmaceutical product industry has the lowest frequency of tax indemnification 
clauses (43.75 percent). 
Table 3, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for my entire contract sample. Firms 
included in my sample are primarily large firms with an even split between multinational firms 
and domestic-only firms; specifically, average (median) year-end assets are approximately 
$2.5240 ($0.7641) billion and 49.90 percent of the firm-years have multinational operations. The 
average firm-year observation experiences tax cash outflows of approximately 8.54 percent of 
year-end assets over the subsequent four years and has UTB reserves equal to 1.31 percent of 
ending total assets. These reserves are economically significant and comparable to Hanlon et 
al.’s (2018) UTB reserve percentage of one percent.  
 Table 3, Panels B and C present descriptive statistics for the subsamples of observations 
without indemnification and those with indemnification. Firms which do not obtain 
indemnification tend to be larger (mean of $4.8640 billion versus $1.9180 billion; t-stat = 
4.6407; p-value < 0.01) and more highly levered (mean of 42.50 percent versus 23.70 percent; t-
                                                          
25 See https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html for classification detail. 
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stat = 4.9293; p-value < 0.01) than firms which do obtain indemnification; this may be due to a 
higher concentration of public-to-public M&As, which tend to be larger firms, within the 
subsample of firms without indemnification. Moreover, the concentration of public-to-public 
M&As may explain the higher consideration as a percentage of last year assets (mean of 25.90 
percent versus 14.00 percent; t-stat = 7.0732; p-value < 0.01) paid to complete M&As within the 
no indemnification subsample.  Furthermore, the lower UTB reserves as a percentage of ending 
total assets (mean of 1.84 percent versus 1.17 percent; t-stat = 2.5536; p-value < 0.01) and lower 
NOL carryforwards as a percentage of beginning assets (mean of 47.10 percent versus 20.60 
percent; t-stat = 2.8427; p-value < 0.01) may be the result of more private companies being 
represented by the subsample of firms with tax indemnification. Specifically, these smaller ratios 
may be due to some private company targets being flow-through tax entities with no UTB 
reserves or NOL carryforwards on their financial statements.  
Table 3, Panel D presents descriptive statistics for the no M&A subsample and is 
presented for comparative purposes. When comparing the no M&A subsample to the M&A 
subsamples, only changes in pre-tax book income is significantly smaller for M&A firms in both 
subsamples (t-statistics = 1.9032 and 2.214; p-values < 0.05 for M&A firms without and with 
indemnification). These reductions to pre-tax book income are likely due to the acquisition of 
depreciable assets, the acquisition of unprofitable targets, and/or the costs associated with the 
acquisition process. Several differences exist when comparing the no M&A subsample to the 
M&A without indemnification subsample. Firms engaging in M&As without indemnification are 
more highly levered (t-statistic = -5.4939; p-value < 0.01) and report higher levels of UTB 
reserves (t-statistic = -3.4377; p-value < 0.01). These higher levels are likely due to the 
concentration of larger, more complex public-to-public M&As in the no indemnification 
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subsample. Furthermore, M&As without indemnification report larger net operating loss 
carryforwards (t-statistic = -2.0932; p-value < 0.05) and lower levels of current and future taxes 
paid (t-statistics = 1.3704 and 2.2918; p-values < 0.10 and 0.05). However, lower current and 
future taxes paid are likely the result of having larger NOL carryforwards. Firms engaging in 
M&As with indemnification do not exhibit these same differences and tend to be smaller firms 
(t-statistic = 3.6343; p-value < 0.01). The differences documented between the no M&A 
subsample and M&A subsamples highlight the importance of allowing coefficients to vary 
across subsamples in later tests. 
Table 4, Panel A presents Pearson (bottom) and Spearman (top) correlations for all model 
variables for the full contract sample, while Panels B and C present Pearson (bottom) and 
Spearman (top) correlations for firms without indemnification and those with indemnification, 
respectively. Correlations which are highly significant (p-value < 0.01) are bolded.  As expected, 
the correlation between future cash taxes paid and current UTB reserves is significant; however, 
contrary to expectations, this correlation is negative.  This may occur because the UTB reserves 
are positively associated with the amount of NOL carryforwards. NOL carryforwards provide 
significant reductions to future cash taxes paid by reducing future taxable income. Therefore, 
firms can utilize NOL carryforwards to offset increases to tax cash outflows resulting from 
successfully challenged uncertain tax positions, which reinforces the need to include this control 
variable in multivariate tests. Furthermore, the presence of a highly significant correlation 
between UTB reserves and future tax cash outflows for firms without indemnification and the 
lack of a highly significant correlation for firms with indemnification provides univariate 
evidence that this association may be impacted by the presence of indemnification. This 
difference and others between the subsamples suggest that the coefficients on the control 
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variables should be allowed to vary across the two subsamples.  Remaining correlations are not 
discussed for brevity. 
Results 
Full Contract Sample 
Table 5, Panel A presents the results from tests using the full sample of M&A contract 
firm-years. As predicted, I find that future tax cash outflows are positively associated with 
current period UTB reserves for firms that do not have tax indemnification (β1 = 12.7209; p-  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics on the full contract sample, the subsample of contracts 
without indemnification, the subsample of contracts with indemnification, and the subsample of 
firms without M&As in Panels A, B, C, and D respectively. Bolded means and medians indicate 
significant differences at the 1% level between Panels B and C. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels, Panel D is winsorized by year. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
 
     Standard       
Variable N Mean Deviation P(25) Median P(75) 
Panel A: Full Contract Sample 
       
Total Assets (in Billions) 355 2.5240 4.9720 0.2945 0.7641 2.0340 
Pretax Return on Assets 355 0.0430 0.1590 -0.0131 0.0647 0.1250 
Leverage Ratio 355 0.2760 0.3000 0.0249 0.1810 0.4170 
Book to Market Ratio 355 0.6410 0.6140 0.3280 0.5370 0.7980 
Multinational 355 0.4990 0.5010 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Unlogged FUT_TXPDt+4 355 0.0854 0.0939 0.0191 0.0518 0.1230 
FUT_TXPDt+4 355 -3.2360 1.5570 -3.9600 -2.9610 -2.0950 
UTBt 355 0.0131 0.0201 0.0017 0.0057 0.0145 
INDEMNt 355 0.7943 0.4050 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
CONSt 355 0.1640 0.1370 0.0664 0.1190 0.2260 
NOLCFt 355 0.2610 0.7170 0.0000 0.0155 0.1910 
TXPDt 355 0.0183 0.0224 0.0020 0.0102 0.0296 
∆_TXPDt 355 0.0004 0.0178 -0.0047 0.0005 0.0073 
∆_PTBIt 355 -0.0082 0.1290 -0.0351 0.0008 0.0278 
DTXt 355 -0.0020 0.0620 -0.0340 -0.0004 0.0197 
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Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation P(25) Median P(75) 
 
Panel B: No Indemnification Subsample (INDEMNt = 0) 
       
Total Assets (in Billions) 73 4.8640 7.2240 0.5003 1.5450 4.8750 
Pretax Return on Assets 73 0.0287 0.1760 -0.0200 0.0587 0.1090 
Leverage Ratio 73 0.4250 0.3880 0.1380 0.3290 0.6740 
Book to Market Ratio 73 0.5390 0.3590 0.2850 0.5010 0.7350 
Multinational 73 0.4520 0.5010 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Unlogged FUT_TXPDt+4 73 0.0683 0.0788 0.0145 0.0388 0.1000 
FUT_TXPDt+4 73 -3.5990 1.7560 -4.2320 -3.2500 -2.3020 
UTBt 73 0.0184 0.0255 0.0020 0.0080 0.0232 
CONSt 73 0.2590 0.1640 0.1170 0.2470 0.3790 
NOLCFt 73 0.4710 1.1570 0.0000 0.0591 0.2500 
TXPDt 73 0.0165 0.0208 0.0020 0.0093 0.0259 
∆_TXPDt 73 0.0016 0.0177 -0.0021 0.0004 0.0060 
∆_PTBIt 73 -0.0164 0.1260 -0.0441 -0.0062 0.0182 
DTXt 73 -0.0127 0.0712 -0.0564 -0.0081 0.0129 
       
Panel C: Indemnification Subsample (INDEMNt = 1) 
       
Total Assets (in Billions) 282 1.9180 3.9980 0.2734 0.6271 1.7340 
Pretax Return on Assets 282 0.0467 0.1550 -0.0079 0.0687 0.1260 
Leverage Ratio 282 0.2370 0.2600 0.0190 0.1540 0.3630 
Book to Market Ratio 282 0.6680 0.6620 0.3390 0.5460 0.8110 
Multinational 282 0.5110 0.5010 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Unlogged FUT_TXPDt+4 282 0.0898 0.0971 0.0207 0.0565 0.1310 
FUT_TXPDt+4 282 -3.1430 1.4900 -3.8790 -2.8740 -2.0350 
UTBt 282 0.0117 0.0182 0.0017 0.0054 0.0138 
CONSt 282 0.1400 0.1180 0.0572 0.1050 0.1770 
NOLCFt 282 0.2060 0.5390 0.0000 0.0129 0.1510 
TXPDt 282 0.0187 0.0228 0.0021 0.0109 0.0297 
∆_TXPDt 282 0.0001 0.0179 -0.0049 0.0006 0.0073 
∆_PTBIt 282 -0.0061 0.1300 -0.0332 0.0024 0.0291 
DTXt 282 0.0008 0.0593 -0.0302 0.0000 0.0207 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics (Cont.) 
 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation P(25) Median P(75) 
 
value < 0.05). Moreover, there is no significant association between current period UTB reserves 
and future tax cash outflows for firms that do have tax indemnification (α1 = 0.1310; p-value = 
0.50). However, the associations are not significantly different from each other (β1 – α1 = 
12.5899; p-value = 0.20). The lack of a significant difference between the UTBt coefficients may 
be due to the fact that not all firms acquire UTB reserves as part of the M&A, that UTB reserves 
acquired may not be a significant portion of overall UTB reserves, or that the statistical power is 
low due to the small sample size. 
Contrary to my prediction, there is no significant association between CONSt and future 
tax cash outflows for firms without indemnification (β2 = -0.3781; p-value = 0.30) or for firms 
with indemnification (α2 = 0.1055; p-value = 0.44). The inability to document a significant 
association between the consideration paid for the target and future tax cash outflows of the  
Panel D: No M&A Subsample  
       
Total Assets (in Billions) 5,937 6.1620 19.2830 0.2675 0.9010 3.4280 
Pretax Return on Assets 5,937 0.0551 0.1580 0.0027 0.0591 0.1250 
Leverage Ratio 5,904 0.2490 0.2770 0.0136 0.1800 0.3690 
Book to Market Ratio 5,486 0.5810 0.7030 0.2680 0.4970 0.8190 
Multinational 5,937 0.4580 0.4980 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Unlogged FUT_TXPDt+4 5,937 0.1040 0.1270 0.0167 0.0599 0.1390 
FUT_TXPDt+4 5,937 -3.1480 1.6200 -4.0930 -2.8150 -1.9750 
UTBt 5,937 0.0111 0.0175 0.0011 0.0050 0.0134 
NOLCFt 5,937 0.2440 0.7400 0.0000 0.0065 0.1310 
TXPDt 5,937 0.0207 0.0285 0.0018 0.0109 0.0295 
∆_TXPDt 5,937 0.0012 0.0195 -0.0046 0.0002 0.0069 
∆_PTBIt 5,937 0.0116 0.1390 -0.0231 0.0082 0.0426 
DTXt 5,937 -0.0029 0.0645 -0.0321 0.0000 0.0263 
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acquirer may be due to acquisitions providing a new source of income for the acquirer while also 
providing substantial tax breaks for the acquirer. Other than for CONSt, the results for the other 
control variables are in line with my predictions. Specifically, NOLCFt has a highly significant, 
negative association with future tax cash outflows for both firms without indemnification (β3 = -
1.0699; p-value < 0.01) and firms with indemnification (α3 = -0.5176; p-value < 0.01). These 
highly significant, negative coefficients are consistent with NOL carryforwards providing 
significant reductions in future taxable income when present. TXPDt has highly significant, 
positive associations with future tax cash outflows for firms without indemnification (β4 = 
38.7797; p-value < 0.01) and firms with indemnification (α4 = 36.2790; p-value < 0.01). These 
highly significant, positive coefficients suggest that levels of taxes paid in the current year are 
persistent in future years. ∆_TXPDt has significant, negative associations with future tax cash 
outflows for firms without indemnification (β5 = -14.4587; p-value < 0.05) and firms with 
indemnification (α5 = -10.6401; p-value < 0.05). These significant negative associations suggest 
that current changes in taxes paid which are not explained by changes in taxable income are 
mean reverting and not persistent, likely due to spikes or dips in taxes paid from tax authority 
settlements or utilization of one-time tax assets (i.e., the utilization of NOL carryforwards or 
credits). ∆_PTBIt has significant, positive associations with future tax cash outflows for firms 
without indemnification (β6 = 1.6896; p-value < 0.10) and firms with indemnification (α6 = 
1.2270; p-value < 0.05). These significant positive associations are in line with prior studies 
which suggest earnings changes are persistent. Therefore, an increase in pre-tax book income 
today results in more future taxable income and, thus, higher future cash taxes paid. Lastly, I 
document a significant, negative coefficient between DTXt and future tax cash outflows for firms 
without indemnification (β7 = -3.3799; p-value < 0.05) but fail to document a significant 
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association for firms with indemnification (α7 = 0.3782; p-value = 0.75). This significant, 
negative coefficient suggests that for firms without indemnification, having more deferred tax 
assets (liabilities) today results in less (more) future tax cash outflows and vice versa. The lack of 
an association for firms with indemnification may be due to the utilization of DTAs offsetting 
indemnified tax payments for successful challenges of tax positions and/or the indemnification of 
deferred tax liabilities associated with uncertain tax positions. This possibility is further explored 
in later additional analyses. 
Subsamples of Contract Firms 
The lack of a significant difference in the association between UTBt and future tax cash 
outflows amongst firms with and without indemnification may be due to firms obtaining 
indemnification from the M&A contract but not obtaining any uncertain tax positions subject to 
indemnification from the target. To further explore this possibility, I attempt to proxy for firms 
obtaining indemnified uncertain tax positions from the target in three different ways: as firms 
which report increases to UTB reserves due to M&As and prior tax positions, as firms which 
report increases to UTB reserves due to M&As and prior tax positions but omitting firms with 
asset purchase contracts, and as firms which specifically report increases to UTB reserves due to 
M&As.26  
As discussed earlier, the FASB standardized the accounting for acquired tax positions, 
but it has not standardized the required disclosures about these positions. For this reason, 
companies can choose to disclose or not disclose the amounts of uncertain tax positions that were 
acquired in an M&A. I examine all 10-k acquisition and income tax disclosures associated with 
located M&A contracts and identify all observations which disclose the acquisition of uncertain 
                                                          
26 For these tests, I hand-collect UTB reserve reconciliation data from the observation’s associated 10-K filed with 
the SEC’s EDGAR system. 
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tax positions. My review suggests that most firms engaging in M&As do not separately disclose 
acquired uncertain tax positions in the reserve reconciliation or within the income tax footnote 
disclosures. Specifically, I find that only 51 observations disclose the amount of uncertain tax 
positions, whether generated or acquired, that are associated with the M&A in the UTB reserve 
reconciliation or income tax footnote disclosures; only one observation separated the 
indemnified portion of these uncertain tax positions from the generated portion. Most of the 
firms that disclose acquired uncertain tax positions report them separately in the UTB reserve 
reconciliation. However, some firms disclose this information in the income tax footnote 
disclosures and report the positions as increases to prior year tax positions in the UTB reserve 
reconciliation. 
Due to the low rate/lack of disclosure of indemnified tax positions, I attempt to proxy for 
firms acquiring indemnified uncertain tax positions. First, I limit my sample only to observations 
that report increases to UTB reserves due to either prior tax positions or acquisitions, which 
yields 223 observations, 48 without indemnification and 175 with indemnification. Table 5, 
Panel B presents the results of estimating Models (1a) and (1b) for this subsample. Consistent 
with the full contract sample, I document that future tax cash outflows are positively associated 
with current UTBt (β1 = 38.0058; p-value < 0.01) for firms without indemnification but not 
significantly associated with current UTBt (α1 = 2.4239; p-value = 0.25) for firms with 
indemnification. Moreover, the association between UTB reserves and future tax cash outflows 
for firms without indemnification is significantly more positive (β1 - α1 = 35.5819; p-value < 
0.01) than for firms with indemnification, which supports H1. These results suggest that UTB 
reserves are less useful for predicting future tax cash outflows in the presence of indemnified tax 
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positions and that increases to prior year UTB reserves in the year of an M&A may be an 
appropriate proxy for identifying firms which acquire uncertain tax positions. 
To further isolate a subset of firms which are directly affected by the accounting for 
uncertain tax positions required under ASC 805 and ASC 740, I remove all asset purchase 
contracts for my second proxy test. Unless substantially all of a target’s assets are acquired, it is 
possible that the acquisition of a target’s assets by means of an asset purchase contract may not 
result in an ASC 805 requirement to record indemnified tax positions of the target.  Therefore, I 
remove all observations with asset purchase contracts which yields 168 observations, 45 without 
indemnification and 123 with indemnification. Results of Models (1a) and (1b) for this 
subsample are shown in Table 5, Panel C. For this subsample, the association between future tax 
cash outflows and UTBt is positive for firms without indemnification (β1 = 39.9744; p-value < 
0.01) but not significant or firms with indemnification (α1 = -2.4674; p-value = 0.34). Moreover, 
I continue to document in Panel C a significant difference between firms with and without 
indemnification (β1 - α1 = 42.4418; p-value < 0.01); this result continues to suggest that the 
presence of indemnified tax positions within UTB reserves may explain the diminished 
association.  
Lastly, I identify firms which did follow ASC 805 to account for their M&A; specifically, 
I identify firms which reported increases to UTB reserves that were due to M&A activity. I 
expect that this further isolation will result in the most likely subsample of firms affected by the 
accounting required under ASC 805 for acquired uncertain tax positions. Table 5, Panel D 
presents the results of testing the subsample of 51 firm-year observations in which increases to 
UTB reserves due to M&A activity were reported, 25 observations without indemnification and 
26 observations with indemnification. By recording an increase to UTB reserves due to M&A 
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activity, a firm would be following business combination guidance under ASC 805 thereby 
ensuring the firm is required to record acquired indemnified tax positions. However, it is possible 
that the UTB reserve increase associated with the M&A may be generated from tax positions 
taken during the M&A and therefore not indemnified. I find that, while the association between 
future tax cash outflows and UTBt is positive for firms without indemnification (β1 = 12.4658; p-
value = 0.25) and negative for firms with indemnification (α1 = -1.1034; p-value = 0.46), neither 
of these associations is significant and the difference between the two is also not statistically 
significant (β1 - α1 = 13.5692; p-value = 0.52). This is a surprising result and may be due to the 
lack of statistical power provided by the extremely small sample size.  
Results from the full contract sample and for the subsamples shown in Table 5 provide 
evidence that the association between UTB reserves and future tax cash outflows is lower when 
UTB reserves contain indemnified tax positions. Moreover, the results are most likely stronger in 
Panels B and C due to the isolation of firms that may have acquired uncertain tax positions as 
part of an M&A in the current year.  My results suggest that financial statement users would 
benefit from more information about acquired uncertain tax positions and the impact that tax 
indemnification has on these positions in the financial statements to facilitate their evaluation of 
a firm’s tax positions and development of expectations of a firm’s future tax cash outflows. 
Comparison to Observations without M&As 
Next, I compare the subsamples of observations from within the contract sample to a 
sample of observations without M&As to determine how the association between UTB reserves 
and future tax cash outflows for firms without M&As compares to the M&A firms with and 
without indemnification. Specifically, I compare the observations without current-year M&As as 
described in Table 1 to subsamples of observations without indemnification, observations with  
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Table 5: UTB Reserves’ Association with Future Tax Cash Outflows 
This table presents the results of performing seemingly unrelated estimations to test differences 
between without indemnification and with indemnification. Panel A presents the results of 
Model (1a) and Model (1b) for all firms in which contracts were obtained regardless of increases 
to UTB reserves, Panel B presents the results of Model (1a) and Model (1b) for firms which 
report increases to UTB reserves due to M&As and prior tax positions, Panel C presents the 
results of Model (1a) and Model (1b) for firms which report increases to UTB reserves due to 
M&As and prior tax positions but omits asset purchase contracts, and Panel D presents the 
results of Model (1a) and Model (1b)  for firms which report increases to UTB reserves due to 
M&As filed.  The dependent variable in all Panels is FUT_TXPDt+4. All variables are defined in 
the Appendix A and all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Cluster 
(company) robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses, χ2-statistics are presented in brackets. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on one-
tailed tests when a direction is predicted, two-tailed otherwise). 
 
  
 Panel A: Full Contract Sample 
 
Panel B: UTB increases due to 
M&As and prior tax positions 










VARIABLES (+,-) FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 
       
UTBt (β1)/(α1) + 12.7209** 0.1310 38.0058*** 2.4239 
  (1.810) (0.020) (4.570) (0.690) 
CONSt (β2)/(α2) - -0.3781 0.1055 -0.1326 0.1297 
  (-0.530) (0.160) (-0.210) (0.180) 
NOLCFt (β3)/(α3) - -1.0699*** -0.5176*** -1.2241*** -0.6535*** 
  (-10.550) (-2.760) (-6.590) (-2.980) 
TXPDt (β4)/(α4) + 38.7797*** 36.2790*** 48.1541*** 30.2294*** 
  (6.110) (9.640) (7.570) (6.500) 
∆_TXPDt (β5)/(α5) - -14.4587** -10.6401** -51.0361*** -9.0089* 
  (-1.850) (-1.990) (-4.880) (-1.330) 
∆_PTBIt (β6)/(α6) + 1.6896* 1.2270** 5.7881*** 0.8195* 
  (1.440) (1.710) (3.590) (1.450) 
DTXt (β7)/(α7) - -3.3799** 0.3782 -7.3916*** -0.2470 
  (-2.190) (0.320) (-4.380) (-0.210) 
CONSTANT (β0)/(α0)  -4.4206*** -3.5565*** -4.4076*** -3.3520*** 
  (-5.910) (-14.680) (-7.300) (-10.890) 
      
Observations  73 282 48 175 
Adjusted R-squared  0.598 0.350 0.642 0.334 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects  NO NO NO NO 
Test of differences      
UTBt (β1 = α1)  12.5899  35.5819***  
  [1.66]  [16.05]  
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Table 5: UTB Reserves’ Association with Future Tax Cash Outflows (Cont.) 
This table presents the results of performing seemingly unrelated estimations to test differences 
between without indemnification and with indemnification. Panel A presents the results of 
Model (1a) and Model (1b) for all firms in which contracts were obtained regardless of increases 
to UTB reserves, Panel B presents the results of Model (1a) and Model (1b) for firms which 
report increases to UTB reserves due to M&As and prior tax positions, Panel C presents the 
results of Model (1a) and Model (1b) for firms which report increases to UTB reserves due to 
M&As and prior tax positions but omits asset purchase contracts, and Panel D presents the 
results of Model (1a) and Model (1b)  for firms which report increases to UTB reserves due to 
M&As filed.  The dependent variable in all Panels is FUT_TXPDt+4. All variables are defined in 
the Appendix A and all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Cluster 
(company) robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses, χ2-statistics are presented in brackets. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on one-
tailed tests when a direction is predicted, two-tailed otherwise). 
 
  
 Panel C: UTB increases due to 
M&As and prior tax positions, 
asset purchase contracts omitted 
Panel D: UTB increases due to 
M&As 
 










VARIABLES (+,-) FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 
       
UTBt (β1)/(α1)  + 39.9744*** -2.4674 12.4658 -1.1034 
  (4.560) (-0.420) (0.690) (-0.090) 
CONSt (β2)/(α2) - -0.3007 0.0250 0.5822 -2.5068** 
  (-0.450) (0.030) (0.470) (-1.950) 
NOLCFt (β3)/(α3) - -1.2344*** -0.4677** -1.1788*** -2.4191** 
  (-5.540) (-2.210) (-5.140) (-2.280) 
TXPDt (β4)/(α4) + 47.2792*** 33.1034*** 43.1095*** 21.9606** 
  (7.350) (5.510) (2.790) (2.100) 
∆_TXPDt (β5)/(α5) - -50.5012*** -17.4651*** -35.6478** -9.1872 
  (-4.550) (-3.250) (-2.190) (-1.210) 
∆_PTBIt (β6)/(α6) + 5.9898*** 1.1787 0.6910 -0.3291 
  (3.100) (1.160) (0.120) (-0.180) 
DTXt (β7)/(α7) - -7.8561*** -0.3669 -5.3212** 1.9832 
  (-4.440) (-0.270) (-1.960) (0.810) 
CONSTANT (β0)/(α0)  -4.3811*** -3.5541*** -4.1790*** -3.2041*** 
  (-6.840) (-8.230) (-6.680) (-3.520) 
      
Observations  45 123 25 26 
Adjusted R-squared  0.623 0.289 0.413 0.321 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects  NO NO NO NO 
Test of differences      
UTBt (β1 = a1)  42.4418***  13.5692  
  [17.11]  [0.42]  
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indemnification, merger contract observations without indemnification, merger contract 
observations with indemnification, asset purchase contract observations with indemnification, 
and interest purchase contract observations with indemnification. Due to earlier results from 
Table 5, Panel B, I repeat these comparisons in subsequent tests after removing all observations 
not reporting increases to prior uncertain tax positions to better identify observations which may 
have acquired indemnified tax positions. My sample for initial tests consists of 6,292 firm-year 
observations from 2,049 firms (5,937 observations from observations without M&As and 355 
observations from the contract sample), while the sample for subsequent tests consists of 3,184 
firm-year observations from 1,248 firms (2,959 observations from observations without M&As 
and 225 observations from the contract sample).  However, total sample sizes vary depending on 
the subsample utilized in the test. 
To begin this comparison, I remove the variable CONSt from Model (1) due to 
consideration amounts not being available for firms not engaging in M&As.27 Using seemingly 
unrelated estimations, the models are as follows: 
No M&A Firm-Years: 
FUT_TXPDt+4 = δ0 + δ1 UTBt + δ2 NOLCFt + δ3 TXPDt + δ4 ∆TXPDt + δ5 ∆PTBIt +  
                       δ6 DTXt r + εt  (2a) 
 
M&A Firm-Years Without Indemnification: 
FUT_TXPDt+4 = β0 + β1 UTBt + β2 NOLCFt + β3 TXPDt + β4 ∆TXPDt + β5 ∆PTBIt +  
                       β6 DTXt r + εt  (2b) 
 
                                                          
27 CONSt is dropped due to systematic differences within this variable that exist amongst the comparison groups. 
Specifically, firms not engaging in current-year M&As results in all observations having a value of zero for CONSt 
in the no M&A subsample. Furthermore, earlier analyses show that CONSt was only significant in the 51-
observation subsample which suggests it may not be a necessary control. Also, it is important to note that in order to 
allow a comparison to firms without M&As these tests utilize the Compustat item TXTUBPOSPINC to identify 
firms reporting increases to prior tax positions. 
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M&A Firm-Years With Indemnification: 
FUT_TXPDt+4 = α0 + α1 UTBt + α2 NOLCFt + α3 TXPDt + α4 ∆TXPDt + α5 ∆PTBIt +  
                       α6 DTXt r + εt  (2c) 
 
I utilize the sample of observations without M&As as a base group and test for differences in the 
association of interest between the subsamples described above.  In these tests, I expect that 
firms without M&As and subsamples without indemnification will exhibit positive associations 
between UTB reserves and future tax cash outflows, while firms with indemnification will not 
exhibit a significant association.  
 Table 6, Panel A presents the results of comparing the no M&A sample to the full 
contract sample, while Panel B presents a similar test but only uses observations with increases 
to prior uncertain tax positions. In line with expectations, I document in Panels A and B that 
observations without M&As (δ1 = 4.2554 and 3.0560; p-values < 0.01 and < 0.05) exhibit 
significant positive coefficients on the association of interest. However, I only document a 
significant positive coefficient on UTBt for M&A firms without indemnification (β1 = 8.9118; p-
value < 0.10) in Panel A. The lack of significance on UTBt for M&A firms without 
indemnification (β1 = 16.2796; p-value = 0.12) in Panel B may be due to the substantial drop in 
statistical power from losing a third of the observations which did not report increases to prior 
uncertain tax positions. Furthermore, I document in Panels A and B that M&A firms with 
indemnification do not exhibit this significant association (α1 = -0.1560 and 1.9997; p-values = 
0.49 and 0.32). These findings suggest that not only does the association of interest vary amongst 
firms engaging in M&As but the association also varies when comparing M&A firms with 
indemnification to firms not engaging in M&As.  Therefore, when an M&A is present with 
indemnification, financial statement users should be wary of using UTB reserves in developing 
expectations about future tax cash outflows.  
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 Table 6, Panel C compares the no M&A sample to the merger contract subsample, while 
Panel D presents a similar comparison but only uses observations with increases to prior 
uncertain tax positions. I document that, when indemnification is not present, firms without and 
with M&As exhibit similar associations between UTB reserves and future tax cash outflows (δ1 - 
β1 = 1.3762 and -9.9312; p-values = 0.82 and 0.48). On the other hand, when indemnification is 
present, I find that the association of interest varies significantly amongst firms without and with 
M&As (δ1 - α1 = 12.2307 and 14.5078; p-values < 0.10).  Moreover, I document that UTB 
reserves may not be informative of future tax cash outflows (α1 = -7.9753; p-value = 0.11) or 
they may exhibit a negative association with future tax cash outflows (α1 = -11.4518; p-value < 
0.10) in the presence of indemnification.  
Table 6, Panel E compares the no M&A sample to the asset and interest purchase 
subsamples with indemnification, while Panel F presents a similar comparison but only uses  
observations with increases to prior uncertain tax positions. The results in Panels E and F are 
generally consistent with prior Panels. Specifically, I document that UTB reserves may not be 
informative of future tax cash outflows when indemnification is present. However, I document a 
significant positive coefficient (α1 = 13.1018; p-value < 0.10) for M&A firms engaging in interest 
purchase contracts with indemnification. The positive coefficient documented for M&A firms 
engaging in interest purchase contracts may be due to positions generated from the M&A which 
are not indemnified but results in increased authoritative scrutiny. However, these conclusions 
will continue to be left to speculation without the additional disclosure of which UTB reserves 
are indemnified and which are not. Overall these results are consistent with H1 and suggest that 
financial statement users should be cautious when evaluating the future tax cash outflows of  
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Table 6: UTB Reserves’ Association with Future Tax Cash Outflows: No M&As vs 
Contract Subsample Tests 
This table presents the results of performing seemingly unrelated estimations using Model (2a), 
Model (2b), and Model (2c) to test differences between observations without M&As and various 
subsamples within the contract sample. Specifically, observations without M&As are compared 
to the full contract sample with and without indemnification, the merger contract sample with 
and without indemnification, asset purchase contract observations with indemnification, and 
interest purchase contract observations with indemnification in Panels A, C, and E, while similar 
tests omitting firms not reporting increases to prior uncertain tax positions are reported in Panels 
B, D, and F. The dependent variable in all Panels is FUT_TXPDt+4. All variables are defined in 
the Appendix A and all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels by year. 
Cluster (company) robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses, χ2-statistics are presented in 
brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively 
(based on one-tailed tests when a direction is predicted, two-tailed otherwise). 
 











VARIABLES (+,-) FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 
      
UTBt (δ1)/(β1)/(α1) + 4.2554*** 8.9118* -0.1560 
  (2.470) (1.310) (-0.020) 
NOLCFt (δ2)/(β2)/(α2) - -0.3076*** -1.1762*** -0.5906*** 
  (-6.910) (-12.430) (-3.030) 
TXPDt (δ3)/(β3)/(α3) + 34.3860*** 39.3805*** 33.9822*** 
  (30.360) (6.340) (8.730) 
∆_TXPDt (δ4)/(β4)/(α4) - -10.7753*** -16.8400*** -9.5896** 
  (-10.340) (-2.990) (-1.780) 
∆_PTBIt (δ5)/(β5)/(α5) + 0.5699*** 0.8118 1.2354** 
  (4.010) (0.980) (1.860) 
DTXt (δ6)/(β6)/(α6) - 0.4662 -3.1609** 0.2757 
  (1.150) (-2.180) (0.230) 
CONSTANT (δ0)/(β0)/(α0)  -3.9925*** -4.4484 -3.4611*** 
  (-61.220) (-7.860) (-16.130) 
     
Observations  5,937 73 282 
Adjusted R-squared  0.375 0.617 0.345 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects  NO NO NO 
     
Test of differences     
UTBt (δ1 = β1)/(δ1  = α1)   -4.6564 4.4114 
   [0.45] [0.30] 
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Table 6: UTB Reserves’ Association with Future Tax Cash Outflows: No M&As vs 
Contract Subsample Tests (Cont.) 
This table presents the results of performing seemingly unrelated estimations using Model (2a), 
Model (2b), and Model (2c) to test differences between observations without M&As and various 
subsamples within the contract sample. Specifically, observations without M&As are compared 
to the full contract sample with and without indemnification, the merger contract sample with 
and without indemnification, asset purchase contract observations with indemnification, and 
interest purchase contract observations with indemnification in Panels A, C, and E, while similar 
tests omitting firms not reporting increases to prior uncertain tax positions are reported in Panels 
B, D, and F. The dependent variable in all Panels is FUT_TXPDt+4. All variables are defined in 
the Appendix A and all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels by year. 
Cluster (company) robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses, χ2-statistics are presented in 
brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively 
(based on one-tailed tests when a direction is predicted, two-tailed otherwise). 
 












VARIABLES (+,-) FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 
      
UTBt (δ1)/(β1)/(α1) + 3.0560** 16.2796 1.9997 
  (1.790) (1.170) (0.480) 
NOLCFt (δ2)/(β2)/(α2) - -0.5214*** -1.1593*** -0.7147*** 
  (-5.640) (-6.260) (-3.150) 
TXPDt (δ3)/(β3)/(α3) + 30.1662*** 45.2637*** 28.1098*** 
  (21.480) (6.570) (5.980) 
∆_TXPDt (δ4)/(β4)/(α4) - -10.4425*** -45.3460*** -9.3502* 
  (-7.940) (-3.320) (-1.440) 
∆_PTBIt (δ5)/(β5)/(α5) + 0.7484*** 1.7096 0.6793* 
  (3.850) (0.610) (1.300) 
DTXt (δ6)/(β6)/(α6) - 0.9869** -5.4072** -0.3683 
  (2.190) (-2.290) (-0.310) 
CONSTANT (δ0)/(β0)/(α0)  -3.6486*** -4.4650*** -3.2576*** 
  (-43.680) (-8.560) (-11.420) 
     
Observations  2,959 50 175 
Adjusted R-squared  0.408 0.551 0.333 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects  NO NO NO 
     
Test of differences     
UTBt (δ1 = β1)/(δ1  = α1)   -13.2236 1.0563 
   [0.90] [0.06] 
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Table 6: UTB Reserves’ Association with Future Tax Cash Outflows: No M&As vs 
Contract Subsample Tests (Cont.) 
This table presents the results of performing seemingly unrelated estimations using Model (2a), 
Model (2b), and Model (2c) to test differences between observations without M&As and various 
subsamples within the contract sample. Specifically, observations without M&As are compared 
to the full contract sample with and without indemnification, the merger contract sample with 
and without indemnification, asset purchase contract observations with indemnification, and 
interest purchase contract observations with indemnification in Panels A, C, and E, while similar 
tests omitting firms not reporting increases to prior uncertain tax positions are reported in Panels 
B, D, and F. The dependent variable in all Panels is FUT_TXPDt+4. All variables are defined in 
the Appendix A and all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels by year. 
Cluster (company) robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses, χ2-statistics are presented in 
brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively 
(based on one-tailed tests when a direction is predicted, two-tailed otherwise). 
 











VARIABLES (+,-) FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 
      
UTBt (δ1)/(β1)/(α1) + 4.2554*** 2.8792 -7.9753 
  (2.470) (0.490) (-1.220) 
NOLCFt (δ2)/(β2)/(α2) - -0.3076*** -1.1391*** -0.3752*** 
  (-6.910) (-12.080) (-2.820) 
TXPDt (δ3)/(β3)/(α3) + 34.3860*** 33.1409*** 37.8482*** 
  (30.360) (5.480) (6.830) 
∆_TXPDt (δ4)/(β4)/(α4) - -10.7753*** -16.9404** -15.5935*** 
  (-10.340) (-1.960) (-2.810) 
∆_PTBIt (δ5)/(β5)/(α5) + 0.5699*** 0.9437* 0.5091 
  (4.010) (1.630) (0.570) 
DTXt (δ6)/(β6)/(α6) - 0.4662 -3.7284*** 1.6270 
  (1.150) (-2.720) (0.880) 
CONSTANT (δ0)/(β0)/(α0)  -3.9925*** -3.8882*** -3.6369*** 
  (-61.220) (-12.360) (-11.200) 
     
Observations  5,937 57 64 
Adjusted R-squared  0.375 0.702 0.399 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects  NO NO NO 
     
Test of differences     
UTBt (δ1 = β1)/(δ1  = α1)   1.3762 12.2307* 
   [0.05] [3.35] 
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Table 6: UTB Reserves’ Association with Future Tax Cash Outflows: No M&As vs 
Contract Subsample Tests (Cont.) 
This table presents the results of performing seemingly unrelated estimations using Model (2a), 
Model (2b), and Model (2c) to test differences between observations without M&As and various 
subsamples within the contract sample. Specifically, observations without M&As are compared 
to the full contract sample with and without indemnification, the merger contract sample with 
and without indemnification, asset purchase contract observations with indemnification, and 
interest purchase contract observations with indemnification in Panels A, C, and E, while similar 
tests omitting firms not reporting increases to prior uncertain tax positions are reported in Panels 
B, D, and F. The dependent variable in all Panels is FUT_TXPDt+4. All variables are defined in 
the Appendix A and all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels by year. 
Cluster (company) robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses, χ2-statistics are presented in 
brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively 
(based on one-tailed tests when a direction is predicted, two-tailed otherwise). 
 












VARIABLES (+,-) FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 
      
UTBt (δ1)/(β1)/(α1) + 3.0560** 12.9872 -11.4518* 
  (1.790) (0.940) (-1.450) 
NOLCFt (δ2)/(β2)/(α2) - -0.5214*** -1.1698*** -0.2739** 
  (-5.640) (-6.460) (-2.000) 
TXPDt (δ3)/(β3)/(α3) + 30.1662*** 41.5880*** 33.9294*** 
  (21.480) (6.410) (4.720) 
∆_TXPDt (δ4)/(β4)/(α4) - -10.4425*** -40.1029*** -18.5910*** 
  (-7.940) (-2.740) (-2.810) 
∆_PTBIt (δ5)/(β5)/(α5) + 0.7484*** 0.8301 -0.0451 
  (3.850) (0.240) (-0.050) 
DTXt (δ6)/(β6)/(α6) - 0.9869** -5.9246*** 4.0074* 
  (2.190) (-2.600) (1.610) 
CONSTANT (δ0)/(β0)/(α0)  -3.6486*** -4.3619*** -3.6502*** 
  (-43.680) (-8.440) (-7.620) 
     
Observations  2,959 43 42 
Adjusted R-squared  0.408 0.546 0.469 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects  NO NO NO 
     
Test of differences     
UTBt (δ1 = β1)/(δ1  = α1)   -9.9312 14.5078* 
   [0.51] [3.35] 
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Table 6: UTB Reserves’ Association with Future Tax Cash Outflows: No M&As vs 
Contract Subsample Tests (Cont.) 
This table presents the results of performing seemingly unrelated estimations using Model (2a), 
Model (2b), and Model (2c) to test differences between observations without M&As and various 
subsamples within the contract sample. Specifically, observations without M&As are compared 
to the full contract sample with and without indemnification, the merger contract sample with 
and without indemnification, asset purchase contract observations with indemnification, and 
interest purchase contract observations with indemnification in Panels A, C, and E, while similar 
tests omitting firms not reporting increases to prior uncertain tax positions are reported in Panels 
B, D, and F. The dependent variable in all Panels is FUT_TXPDt+4. All variables are defined in 
the Appendix A and all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels by year. 
Cluster (company) robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses, χ2-statistics are presented in 
brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively 
(based on one-tailed tests when a direction is predicted, two-tailed otherwise). 
 











VARIABLES (+,-) FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 
      
UTBt (δ1)/(α1)/(α1) + 4.2554*** 1.6835 -6.9853 
  (2.470) (0.170) (-0.550) 
NOLCFt (δ2)/(α2)/(α2) - -0.3076*** -0.6477*** -0.5739* 
  (-6.910) (-2.590) (-1.560) 
TXPDt (δ3)/(α3)/(α3) + 34.3860*** 38.9081*** 33.1574*** 
  (30.360) (6.800) (5.920) 
∆_TXPDt (δ4)/(α4)/(α4) - -10.7753*** 3.3822 -21.5546*** 
  (-10.340) (0.340) (-2.620) 
∆_PTBIt (δ5)/(α5)/(α5) + 0.5699*** 0.2954 4.6757*** 
  (4.010) (0.430) (3.230) 
DTXt (δ6)/(α6)/(α6) - 0.4662 1.5055 -1.2317 
  (1.150) (0.810) (-0.810) 
CONSTANT (δ0)/(α0)/(α0)  -3.9925*** -3.2670*** -3.3403*** 
  (-61.220) (-10.160) (-9.830) 
     
Observations  5,937 96 121 
Adjusted R-squared  0.375 0.399 0.349 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects  NO NO NO 
     
Test of differences     
UTBt (δ1 = α1)/(δ1  = α1)   2.5719 11.2407 
   [0.06] [0.77] 
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Table 6: UTB Reserves’ Association with Future Tax Cash Outflows: No M&As vs 
Contract Subsample Tests (Cont.) 
This table presents the results of performing seemingly unrelated estimations using Model (2a), 
Model (2b), and Model (2c) to test differences between observations without M&As and various 
subsamples within the contract sample. Specifically, observations without M&As are compared 
to the full contract sample with and without indemnification, the merger contract sample with 
and without indemnification, asset purchase contract observations with indemnification, and 
interest purchase contract observations with indemnification in Panels A, C, and E, while similar 
tests omitting firms not reporting increases to prior uncertain tax positions are reported in Panels 
B, D, and F. The dependent variable in all Panels is FUT_TXPDt+4. All variables are defined in 
the Appendix A and all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels by year. 
Cluster (company) robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses, χ2-statistics are presented in 
brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively 
(based on one-tailed tests when a direction is predicted, two-tailed otherwise). 
 
Panel F: No M&As vs Other Subsamples with Indemnification, Observations with 











VARIABLES (+,-) FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 
      
UTBt (δ1)/(α1)/(α1) + 3.0560** 3.0655 13.1018* 
  (1.790) (0.570) (1.630) 
NOLCFt (δ2)/(α2)/(α2) - -0.5214*** -1.4377*** -0.8746*** 
  (-5.640) (-4.390) (-2.510) 
TXPDt (δ3)/(α3)/(α3) + 30.1662*** 23.6846*** 30.8758*** 
  (21.480) (3.390) (4.070) 
∆_TXPDt (δ4)/(α4)/(α4) - -10.4425*** 10.1317 -19.6471** 
  (-7.940) (0.560) (-2.210) 
∆_PTBIt (δ5)/(α5)/(α5) + 0.7484*** 0.9613** 2.2777 
  (3.850) (2.380) (1.070) 
DTXt (δ6)/(α6)/(α6) - 0.9869** 0.5664 -2.2399 
  (2.190) (0.270) (-1.150) 
CONSTANT (δ0)/(α0)/(α0)  -3.6486*** -2.6957*** -3.5573*** 
  (-43.680) (-6.510) (-6.410) 
     
Observations  2,959 52 80 
Adjusted R-squared  0.408 0.459 0.228 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects  NO NO NO 
     
Test of differences     
UTBt (δ1 = α1)/(δ1  = α1)   -0.0095 -10.0458 
   [0.00] [1.52] 
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firms from UTB reserves, especially in the presence of M&A activity.  Controls are generally 
consistent with earlier results and therefore not discussed for brevity.  
Proxies for Tax Indemnification 
Earlier results suggest that the identification of contracts with tax indemnification may 
benefit financial statement users. However, M&A contracts are not filed often; specifically, I was 
only able to locate 26.89 percent of the contracts from my potential contract pool. Therefore, I 
attempt to identify a proxy for the presence of tax indemnification to aid financial statement 
users in assessing the association between UTB reserves and future tax cash outflows when 
M&A contracts are not available. My examination of available M&A contracts suggests that 
approximately 80 percent of all M&A contracts contain tax indemnification clauses. Due to this 
high frequency, the presence of an M&A may proxy for the presence of tax indemnification 
clauses in a larger sample of firms. To test this possibility, I follow earlier sample selection 
techniques but only remove observations from foreign filers and REITs, observations without all 
necessary data items available to compute my model variables and observations with negative 
sales or negative assets. My final sample for the M&A proxy tests consists of 8,567 firm-year 
observations (5,937 without a current year M&A and 2,630 with a current year M&A) from  
2,237 firms. With this sample, I perform seemingly unrelated estimations to test for differences 
in the association between UTB reserves and future tax cash outflows using Model (2a) for firms 
without M&As (without indemnification) and Model (2c) for firms with M&As (with 
indemnification).  
Table 7, Panel A presents results using the presence of an M&A as a proxy for 
indemnification, while Panel B presents similar tests but omits observations not reporting 
increases to prior uncertain tax positions. Consistent with tests using the full contract sample, I 
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find that firms without M&As have a positive association between UTB reserves and future tax 
cash outflows (δ1 = 4.2554 and 3.0560; p-values < 0.01 and 0.05). However, the association in 
Panel A between UTB reserves and future cash outflows for firms with M&As is positive (α1 = 
3.1370; p-value < 0.10) when not attempting to isolate M&As that may have acquired tax 
positions. When attempting to isolate M&As which may have acquired tax positions in Panel B, 
I find an insignificant negative association on the variable of interest (α1 = -1.0872; p-value = 
0.32), which is in line with expectations. However, it is not significantly different than the 
association documented in the sample of firms without M&As (δ1 - α1 = 4.1432; p-value = 0.12). 
These results suggest that the presence of an M&A is not by itself an adequate proxy for tax 
indemnification. However, identifying firms with M&As that also report increases to prior 
uncertain tax positions comes closer to results in Table 5, where the indemnification status is 
known, but still does not fully isolate those firms with indemnification.  
Descriptive statistics in Table 2 document that approximately 93.69 percent of non-public 
M&As, 84.06 percent of M&As with less than $1 billion in consideration paid, and 93.16 percent 
of non-merger M&As in my sample have indemnification. Due to these high frequencies, it is 
possible that this readily available information may proxy for the presence of indemnification 
when contracts are not available. To test this possibility, I utilize the M&A proxy test sample but 
remove all observations with more than one M&A during the year.28 This sample consists of 
7,257 firm-year observations from 2,157 firms. 
I then perform seemingly unrelated estimations to test for differences in the association 
between UTB reserves and future tax cash outflows for public targets versus non-public targets,  
                                                          
28 Firms can have multiple M&As of varying characteristics in a given year which can complicate interpreting 
results; for instance, an observation can have a merger contract for a private target and an asset purchase contract for 
a public target within the same year. Therefore, I remove all observations with more than one M&A to ease 
modeling and interpreting these proxy tests. 
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Table 7: UTB Reserves’ Association with Future Tax Cash Outflows when using Various 
Identifiers to Proxy for Indemnification 
 
This table presents the results of utilizing M&As, non-public targets, M&A deals with 
consideration less than one billion, and non-Merger M&A deals as proxies for tax 
indemnification, while subsequent tests consider only firms reporting increases to prior uncertain 
tax positions. Specifically, this table presents the results of performing seemingly unrelated 
estimations to test differences between without M&As and with M&As subsamples. The 
dependent variable is FUT_TXPDt+4. All variables are defined in the Appendix A and all 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels by year. Cluster (company) robust 
z-statistics are presented in parentheses, χ2-statistics are presented in brackets. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on one-tailed tests 




 Panel A: All Observations 
 
Panel B: Observations with 
Increases to Prior Tax Positions 
      
  Without M&As  With M&As Without M&As  With M&As 
VARIABLES (+,-) FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 
       
UTBt (δ1)/(α1) + 4.2554*** 3.1370* 3.0560** -1.0872 
  (2.470) (1.350) (1.790) (-0.480) 
NOLCFt (δ2)/(α2) - -0.3076*** -0.5576*** -0.5214*** -0.4124** 
  (-6.910) (-3.050) (-5.640) (-1.850) 
TXPDt (δ3)/(α3) + 34.3860*** 36.5031*** 30.1662*** 33.5430*** 
  (30.360) (23.130) (21.480) (19.620) 
∆_TXPDt (δ4)/(α4) - -10.7753*** -13.0946*** -10.4425*** -13.2482*** 
  (-10.340) (-8.270) (-7.940) (-7.100) 
∆_PTBIt (δ5)/(α5) + 0.5699*** 1.2033*** 0.7484*** 0.9361*** 
  (4.010) (5.050) (3.850) (2.780) 
DTXt (δ6)/(α6) - 0.4662 0.0638 0.9869** 0.3852 
  (1.150) (0.140) (2.190) (0.810) 
CONSTANT (δ0)/(α0)  -3.9925*** -3.7985*** -3.6486*** -3.6350*** 
  (-61.220) (-46.970) (-43.680) (-38.340) 
      
Observations  5,937 2,630 2,959 1,713 
Adjusted R-squared  0.375 0.416 0.408 0.412 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects  NO NO NO NO 
      
Test of differences      
UTBt (δ1 = α1)  1.1184  4.1432  
  [0.16]  [2.45]  
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Table 7: UTB Reserves’ Association with Future Tax Cash Outflows when using Various 
Identifiers to Proxy for Indemnification (Cont.) 
 
This table presents the results of utilizing M&As, non-public targets, M&A deals with 
consideration less than one billion, and non-Merger M&A deals as proxies for tax 
indemnification, while subsequent tests consider only firms reporting increases to prior uncertain 
tax positions. Specifically, this table presents the results of performing seemingly unrelated 
estimations to test differences between without M&As and with M&As subsamples. The 
dependent variable is FUT_TXPDt+4. All variables are defined in the Appendix A and all 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels by year. Cluster (company) robust 
z-statistics are presented in parentheses, χ2-statistics are presented in brackets. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on one-tailed tests 




 Panel C: Non-Public Targets, All 
Observations 
 
Panel D: Non-Public Targets, 
Observations with Increases to 
Prior Tax Positions  
      
 
 Without M&As 











VARIABLES (+,-) FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 
       
UTBt (β1)/(α1) + 4.0411*** 4.3225* 3.0148** 1.4075 
  (2.350) (1.370) (1.780) (0.510) 
NOLCFt (β2)/(α2) - -0.3195*** -0.6042*** -0.5204*** -0.6086*** 
  (-6.990) (-4.520) (-5.650) (-3.240) 
TXPDt (β3)/(α3) + 34.4940*** 34.3892*** 30.2559*** 32.7311*** 
  (30.510) (19.170) (21.570) (16.290) 
∆_TXPDt (β4)/(α4) - -10.8081*** -13.1572*** -10.4915*** -14.5268*** 
  (-10.420) (-5.400) (-8.030) (-4.880) 
∆_PTBIt (β5)/(α5) + 0.5664*** 1.8157*** 0.7158*** 1.5444*** 
  (4.060) (5.530) (3.810) (3.480) 
DTXt (β6)/(α6) - 0.3962 0.4655 0.9115** 0.6289 
  (0.980) (0.750) (2.060) (0.990) 
CONSTANT (β0)/(α0)  -3.9959*** -3.7539*** -3.6511*** -3.6779*** 
  (-61.730) (-33.610) (-43.940) (-25.250) 
      
Observations  6,035 1,222 3,016 758 
Adjusted R-squared  0.376 0.409 0.406 0.435 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects  NO NO NO NO 
      
Test of differences      
UTBt (β1 = α1)  -0.2814  1.6073  
  [0.01]  [0.28]  
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Table 7: UTB Reserves’ Association with Future Tax Cash Outflows when using Various 
Identifiers to Proxy for Indemnification (Cont.) 
 
This table presents the results of utilizing M&As, non-public targets, M&A deals with 
consideration less than one billion, and non-Merger M&A deals as proxies for tax 
indemnification, while subsequent tests consider only firms reporting increases to prior uncertain 
tax positions. Specifically, this table presents the results of performing seemingly unrelated 
estimations to test differences between without M&As and with M&As subsamples. The 
dependent variable is FUT_TXPDt+4. All variables are defined in the Appendix A and all 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels by year. Cluster (company) robust 
z-statistics are presented in parentheses, χ2-statistics are presented in brackets. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on one-tailed tests 
when a direction is predicted, two-tailed otherwise). 
 
  
 Panel E: M&As with 
Consideration Less Than $1 
Billion, All Observations 
 
Panel F: M&As with 
Consideration Less Than $1 
Billion, Observations with 
Increases to Prior Tax Positions 




= ? and M&As 
> $1 billion 






= ? and M&As 
> $1 billion 




VARIABLES (+,-) FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 
       
UTBt (β1)/(α1) + 4.3192*** 2.6927 2.6635** 3.2697 
  (2.610) (0.710) (1.660) (0.910) 
NOLCFt (β2)/(α2) - -0.3172*** -0.7392*** -0.5120*** -0.7212*** 
  (-7.180) (-5.390) (-5.680) (-4.490) 
TXPDt (β3)/(α3) + 34.3501*** 37.8007*** 30.5360*** 33.3368*** 
  (31.740) (13.740) (23.380) (9.300) 
∆_TXPDt (β4)/(α4) - -10.8875*** -15.8937*** -10.8325*** -16.5947*** 
  (-10.920) (-4.130) (-8.800) (-3.250) 
∆_PTBIt (β5)/(α5) + 0.6737*** 1.3598*** 0.8305*** 1.3237** 
  (4.970) (3.040) (4.660) (1.810) 
DTXt (β6)/(α6) - 0.4444 0.1568 0.8323** 0.9556 
  (1.150) (0.180) (2.000) (1.000) 
CONSTANT (β0)/(α0)  -3.9812*** -3.7818*** -3.6523*** -3.7234*** 
  (-64.350) (-24.770) (-46.650) (-17.740) 
      
Observations  6,581 676 3,388 386 
Adjusted R-squared  0.380 0.401 0.414 0.377 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects  NO NO NO NO 
Test of differences      
UTBt (β1 = α1)  1.6265  -0.6062  
  [0.17]  [0.03]  
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Table 7: UTB Reserves’ Association with Future Tax Cash Outflows when using Various 
Identifiers to Proxy for Indemnification (Cont.) 
 
This table presents the results of utilizing M&As, non-public targets, M&A deals with 
consideration less than one billion, and non-Merger M&A deals as proxies for tax 
indemnification, while subsequent tests consider only firms reporting increases to prior uncertain 
tax positions. Specifically, this table presents the results of performing seemingly unrelated 
estimations to test differences between without M&As and with M&As subsamples. The 
dependent variable is FUT_TXPDt+4. All variables are defined in the Appendix A and all 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels by year. Cluster (company) robust 
z-statistics are presented in parentheses, χ2-statistics are presented in brackets. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (based on one-tailed tests 
when a direction is predicted, two-tailed otherwise). 
 
  
 Panel G: Merger M&As, All 
Observations 
 
Panel H: Non-merger M&As, 
Observations with Increases to 
Prior Tax Positions 
      
 












VARIABLES (+,-) FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 
       
UTBt (β1)/(α1) + 3.8189** 5.5290* 2.7263* 2.6269 
  (2.240) (1.610) (1.640) (0.880) 
NOLCFt (β2)/(α2) - -0.3276*** -0.5273*** -0.5255*** -0.5623*** 
  (-7.090) (-3.550) (-5.770) (-2.680) 
TXPDt (β3)/(α3) + 34.5173*** 34.4074*** 30.3705*** 32.5034*** 
  (30.730) (17.600) (21.870) (14.730) 
∆_TXPDt (β4)/(α4) - -10.9635*** -12.4118*** -10.7925*** -13.2052*** 
  (-10.680) (-4.690) (-8.360) (-3.990) 
∆_PTBIt (β5)/(α5) + 0.5801*** 1.7686*** 0.7431*** 1.4529*** 
  (4.170) (5.230) (3.950) (3.100) 
DTXt (β6)/(α6) - 0.4506 0.1879 0.9350** 0.4863 
  (1.140) (0.280) (2.150) (0.730) 
CONSTANT (β0)/(α0)  -3.9787*** -3.8424*** -3.6348*** -3.7690*** 
  (-62.120) (-31.730) (-44.400) (-24.320) 
      
Observations  6,203 1,054 3,125 649 
Adjusted R-squared  0.377 0.394 0.408 0.423 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects  NO NO NO NO 
      
Test of differences      
UTBt (β1 = α1)  -1.7101  0.0994  
  [0.21]  [0.00]  
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M&A deals with consideration of $1 billion or greater versus M&A deals with consideration of 
less than $1 billion, and merger M&A contracts versus non-merger M&A contracts (no 
indemnification proxy vs indemnification proxy, respectively) using Models (2b) and (2c). Table 
7, Panels C, E, and G present these results using the described sample, while Panels D, F, and H 
repeat analyses using a sample of observations which report increases to prior uncertain tax 
positions. Similar to earlier results, I document in Table 7, Panels D, E, F, and H results 
consistent with a significant positive association between UTB reserves and future cash taxes 
paid for firms deemed to have no indemnification and no significant association for firms 
deemed to have indemnification using each of the proxies for indemnification. However, 
coefficients on the association of interest in Panels F and H are similar or higher for the 
indemnification proxy sample in comparison with the no indemnification sample, which is not 
consistent with expectations. Therefore, researchers may include controls for firms which report 
increases to prior uncertain tax positions and acquire non-public targets and controls for firms 
that acquire targets for less than $1 billion in consideration as proxies for indemnification in 
studies examining the association between UTB reserves and future tax cash outflows. However, 
none of these proxies adequately identify firms with indemnification. Therefore, users of these 
proxies should exercise caution when interpreting results which rely on these proxies. 
Robustness Analyses 
Descriptive statistics suggest that variables within Model (1) should be allowed to vary 
between firms with indemnification and those without. Two approaches can be utilized to allow 
these associations to vary and test for differences across the subsamples. These approaches 
include seemingly unrelated estimations and interaction models. Both methods should provide 
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similar inferences. To provide comfort that earlier results were not due to a statistical method 
choice, I reperform tests from Table 5 using the following interaction model: 
FUT_TXPDt+4 = β0 + β1 INDEMNt + β2 UTBt + β3 INDEMNt * UTBt + βk CONTROLk + 
βj INDEMNt * CONTROLk + εt  (3) 
 
UTBt is expected to be positive (β2 > 0) and reflects the association between UTB 
reserves and future tax cash outflows for the subsample of firms not obtaining indemnification 
from the M&A contract. The joint effect of interest is expected to be lower than the association 
documented on UTBt (β2 + β3) and reflects the association between UTB reserves and future tax 
cash outflows for the subsample of firms obtaining indemnification from M&A contracts. The 
interaction alone between INDEMNt and UTBt is expected to be negative (β3 < 0) and tests 
whether the association of interest varies between the two subsamples. Expectations for control 
variables are similar to earlier predictions and not discussed for brevity. 
Results are presented in Table 8 from utilizing the interaction model approach. UTBt has 
significant, positive coefficients in Columns 1, 2, and 3 (β2 = 14.3851, 23.2326, and 25.0185; p-
values < 0.05, 0.01, and 0.01) while the joint effects are not significant in all four Columns (β2 + 
β3  = 0.0612, 1.9230, -3.3561, and 0.6979; p-values =  0.99, 0.62, 0.59, and 0.97). Furthermore, I 
document in Columns 1, 2, and 3 that the association of interest in significantly lower when 
comparing observations with indemnification to firms without indemnification (β3 = -14.3239, -
21.3096, and -28.3746; p-values < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01). These results suggest that the variation 
documented in the presence of indemnification is not due to the earlier design choice of using 




Table 8: Interaction Model of UTB Reserves’ Association with Future Tax Cash Outflows 
This table presents the results of utilizing interaction models to test differences between without 
indemnification and with indemnification. Column (1) presents the results of Model (3) for all 
firms in which contracts were obtained regardless of increases to UTB reserves, Column (2) 
presents the results of Model (3) for firms which report increases to UTB reserves due to M&As 
and prior tax positions, Column (3) presents the results of Model (3) for firms which report 
increases to UTB reserves due to M&As and prior tax positions but omits asset purchase 
contracts, and Column (4) presents the results of Model (3) for firms which report increases to 
UTB reserves due to M&As filed.  The dependent variable in all Panels is FUT_TXPDt+4. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix A and all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels. Cluster (company) robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses, f-statistics are 
presented in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
















VARIABLES (+,-) FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 
       
INDEMNt (β1) ? 0.1508 0.4098 0.4810 1.1979 
  (0.362) (1.044) (0.985) (1.353) 
UTBt (β2) + 14.3851** 23.2326*** 25.0185*** 3.5951 
  (1.912) (2.618) (2.655) (0.121) 
INDEMNt* UTBt (β3) - -14.3239* -21.3096** -28.3746*** -2.8972 
  (-1.350) (-2.269) (-2.637) (-0.086) 
      
β2 + β3  0.0612 1.9230 -3.3561 0.6979 
  [0.00] [0.25] [0.29] [0.00] 
      
      
Controls  YES YES YES YES 
Interactions  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  355 223 168 51 
Adjusted R-squared  0.415 0.366 0.340 0.310 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects  NO NO NO NO 
      
 
Though my sample runs from 2008 through 2013, I require data through 2017 to 
calculate my dependent variable, FUT_TXPDt+4. In 2017, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 
was implemented and required firms to treat post-1986 untaxed foreign earnings as if they had 
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been repatriated; this tax was referred to as a transition tax. Due to the substantial transition tax 
liability that firms were facing under this new law, Congress allowed this tax to be paid over 
eight years starting in 2017. This transition tax may create significant spikes in cash taxes paid in 
2017, possibly influencing the empirical tests. To address this potential issue, I exclude 
observations which require 2017 data (year t is 2013) and reperform earlier analyses. Earlier 
inferences from Tables 5 through 7 remain unchanged. 
As in any small sample analysis, it is possible that a few influential observations could 
completely change the inferences of the regression. To explore this possibility, I calculate DF 
betas for all samples listed in Table 5, remove any observations where their DF betas exceed 2
√𝑛𝑛
 
(where n represents to total number of observations prior to removing DF betas), and reperform 
Table 5 analyses. The removal of influential observations in Panels A, B, C, and D from Table 5 
results in new sample sizes of 333, 208, 157, and 48, respectfully. With the removal of these 
influential observations, inferences from Table 5 regressions remain unchanged.  
Though financial statement users may not be able to determine accurate predictions of 
future income, the associations documented in Table 5 may be due to differences in future 
income provided by M&As. I address this potential issue by controlling for cumulative future 
pretax book income over four years scaled by current ending total assets and rerun Table 5 tests. 
In general, inferences from Table 5 remain the same. Specifically, I continue to document 
significant, positive coefficients on UTB reserves for firms without indemnification (except for 
the reduced sample), and I continue to document significantly lower UTB reserve coefficients for 
the two subsamples proxying for acquiring indemnified tax positions. However, the insignificant 
coefficient on UTB reserves documented for indemnified firms which report increases to prior 
tax positions becomes weakly significant (p-value < 0.10). Furthermore, the inclusion of future 
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pretax income subsumes a significant portion of the explanatory power from other control 
variables. These results suggest that earlier documented results are not solely the product of 
income generated from the M&A. 
 
4. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
Indemnified Tax Positions and ETRs  
As discussed in section 2, adjustments to indemnified uncertain tax positions in future 
years under ASC 805 and SEC guidance potentially result in understated GAAP ETRs and 
overstated cash ETRs in future years.  However, the understatement and overstatement may not 
be severe if the indemnified firm receives reimbursements under the indemnification agreement 
that are close to the initial amount recorded for the indemnified tax positions or if these initial 
positions were immaterial in comparison to overall tax expense.  To explore the severity of this 
issue, I present in Table 9 future GAAP and cash ETR averages, means and tests of differences 
between those statistics for the subsamples used in Table 5; specifically, Table 9 presents the 
subsequent four-year cumulative GAAP ETRs, GETRt+4, and the subsequent four-year 
cumulative cash ETRs, CETRt+4 for observations without indemnification, observations with 
indemnification, and observations without M&As.  
Results indicate that when M&As are not present, future GAAP and cash ETRs are 
similar (t-statistic = 0.2525; p-value = 0.80). However, firms engaging in M&As experience a 
gap between their GAAP and cash ETRs; this gap is significant in Panels B, C, and D for 
observations without indemnification (t-statistic = 2.2564, 2.1105, and 1.7566; p-values < 0.05). 
This gap may be due to non-indemnified M&A firms having larger beginning NOL 
carryforwards than both no M&A firms and indemnified firms (47.10 percent versus 24.40 
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Table 9: GAAP and Cash ETR Test of Differences 
 
The variables of interest are future ETRs, GETRt+4 and CETRt+4, in all Panels. Means and 
medians are presented for observations without indemnification (columns titled “Without”) and 
observations with indemnification (columns titled “With”). T-statistics and z-statistics are 
presented for tests of differences in means and means between firms with and without 
indemnification. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. * and ** 
indicate significance at the 0.10 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Full contract sample 
  Means Medians Test Statistics 
Variables N Without With Without With t-Stat z-Stat 
               
GETRt+4 355 0.1581 0.2195 0.2646 0.2993 0.7712 0.3300 
CETRt+4 355 0.1061 0.2279 0.1713 0.2419 1.8164** 1.6780* 
Test Statistics  0.6911 0.2136     
 
Panel B: UTB increases due to M&As and prior tax positions 
  Means Medians Test Statistics 
Variables N Without With Without With t-Stat z-Stat 
               
GETRt+4 223 0.3303 0.2293 0.2794 0.2841 1.0663 0.7980 
CETRt+4 223 0.1649 0.2282 0.2324 0.2623 0.7199 0.7500 
Test Statistics  2.2564** 0.0195     
 
Panel C: UTB increases due to M&As and prior tax positions, Asset Purchase Contracts Omitted 
  Means Medians Test Statistics 
Variables N Without With Without With t-Stat z-Stat 
               
GETRt+4 168 0.3380 0.2405 0.2780 0.2838 1.0465 0.8290 
CETRt+4 168 0.1735 0.2358 0.2356 0.2501 0.6623 0.2060 
Test Statistics  2.1105** 0.0711     
 
Panel D: UTB increases due to M&As 
  Means Medians Test Statistics 
Variables N Without With Without With t-Stat z-Stat 
               
GETRt+4 51 0.3159 0.1412 0.2933 0.2368 1.6938* 1.5830 
CETRt+4 51 0.2172 0.3270 0.2690 0.2695 0.8608 0.3200 
Test Statistics  1.7566** 1.4112*     
 
Panel E: No M&As 
     
Variables N Means Medians   
               
GETRt+4 5,937 0.2024 0.2881  
CETRt+4 5,937 0.2043 0.2200   
Test Statistic  0.2525     
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percent and 20.60 percent of beginning assets).  Future GAAP ETR means for firms with 
indemnification are lower than the future GAAP ETR means for firms without indemnification 
in the years following an M&A in Panels B, C, and D; however, the difference is only 
statistically significant in Panel D (0.3159 > 0.1412, t-statistic = 1.6938, p-value < 0.10). 
Furthermore, future cash ETR means for firms with indemnification are higher than the future 
cash ETR means for firms without indemnification in the years following an M&A in all four 
panels; however, the difference is only statistically significant in Panel A (0.1061 < 0.2279, t-
statistic = 1.8164, p-value < 0.05). These results are suggestive that the accounting for the 
removal of expired indemnified tax positions may distort both GAAP and cash ETRs, but these 
univariate tests have limited statistical power and further research is necessary to adequately 
explore this issue.  
Deferred Tax Assets and Liabilities 
Deferred tax assets should be indicative of reductions to future taxable income, while 
deferred tax liabilities should be indicative of additions to future taxable income.  For this 
reason, DTXt is expected to have a negative association with future tax cash outflows. However, 
I document in Tables 5 and 6, Panels A through D, that this association is generally negative for 
M&A firms without indemnification but not significant for M&A firms with indemnification 
across all six panels.  However, the Table 6 results indicate that this association varies from 
being insignificant to significantly positive for firms without M&As depending on the sample 
used, which is a surprising result. It is possible that these results may be due to the design choice  
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Table 10: Replacement of DTXt 
These panels present the results of reperforming main analyses from Table 5 through Table 6, 
Panel B after replacing DTXt with DTt. Refer to cross-referenced Tables for additional 
information. 
 










VARIABLES (+,-) FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 
       
UTBt (β1)/(α1) + 14.3848** -0.0233 37.8330*** 2.4376 
  (2.010) (0.000) (4.400) (0.700) 
DTt (β7)/(α7) - -3.6561** 0.1685 -7.2920*** 0.0466 
  (-2.160) (0.150) (-4.190) (0.040) 
      
Other Controls  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  73 282 48 175 
Adjusted R-squared  0.598 0.350 0.638 0.334 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES 
      
Test of differences      
UTBt (β1 = α1)  14.4081  35.3954***  
  [2.05]  [14.93]  
DTt (β7 = α7)  -3.8246*  -7.3386***  
  [3.65]  [12.03]  
    










VARIABLES (+,-) FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 
       
UTBt (β1)/(α1) + 39.7601*** -2.4685 13.0945 -1.8211 
  (4.420) (-0.430) (0.760) (-0.150) 
DTt (β7)/(α7) - -7.7236*** -0.1702 -5.7044** 2.1237 
  (-4.300) (-0.120) (-2.180) (0.850) 
      
Other Controls  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  45 123 25 26 
Adjusted R-squared  0.624 0.289 0.422 0.324 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES 
      
Test of differences      
UTBt (β1 = α1)  42.2286***  14.9156  
  [16.27]  [0.54]  
DTt (β7 = α7)  -7.5534***  -7.8281**  
  [11.14]  [4.69]  
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Table 10: Replacement of DTXt  (Cont.) 
These panels present the results of reperforming main analyses from Table 5 through Table 6, 
Panel B after replacing DTXt with DTt. Refer to cross-referenced Tables for additional 
information. 
 












VARIABLES (+,-) FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 
      
UTBt (δ1)/(β1)/(α1) + 4.1661*** 10.5572* -0.2697 
  (2.370) (1.520) (-0.030) 
DTt (δ6)/(β6)/(α6) - 0.2213 -3.5734** 0.1194 
  (0.530) (-2.200) (0.110) 
     
Other Controls  YES YES YES 
Observations  5,937 73 282 
Adjusted R-squared  0.375 0.618 0.345 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES 
     
Test of differences     
UTBt (δ1 = β1)/(δ1  = α1)   -6.3911 4.4358 
   [0.81] [0.29] 
DTt (δ6 = β6)/(δ6  = α6)   3.7947** 0.1019 
   [5.23] [0.01] 
 












VARIABLES (+,-) FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 
      
UTBt (δ1)/(β1)/(α1) + 2.8168* 20.4873* 2.0233 
  (1.610) (1.560) (0.490) 
DTt (δ6)/(β6)/(α6) - 0.7858** -6.4944*** 0.0125 
  (1.690) (-2.870) (0.010) 
     
Other Controls  YES YES YES 
Observations  2,959 50 175 
Adjusted R-squared  0.407 0.579 0.332 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES 
     
Test of differences     
UTBt (δ1 = β1)/(δ1  = α1)   -4.6564 0.7935 
   [0.45] [0.03] 
DTt (δ6 = β6)/(δ6  = α6)   7.2802*** 0.7733 
   [9.92] [0.39] 
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of adjusting net deferred tax assets (liabilities) for temporary uncertain tax positions. To explore 
this possibility, I remove the adjustment to DTXt and reperform all tests from Table 5 through 
Table 6, Panel B. DTt reflects the unadjusted net deferred tax asset (liability) scaled by year-end 
total assets. Expectations for this variable remain the same and results of these tests are presented  
in Table 10. Comparing Table 10 to Tables 5 and 6, I find that the inferences remain the same for 
the associations between future tax cash outflows and both UTB reserves and net deferred tax 
assets (liabilities), indicating that my findings are generally not impacted by the inclusion of 
UTB reserves related to timing differences in DTXt. 
I further explore whether firms with net deferred tax assets differ from firms with net 
deferred liabilities in terms of the associations between net deferred items and future tax cash 
outflows and whether these associations differ in the presence of indemnification. To explore this 
possibility, I split DTt into two variables: DT_At and DT_Lt. If gross deferred tax assets exceed 
the valuation allowance (which represents management’s expectations of the firm’s ability to 
generate income to utilize the assets) and any deferred tax liabilities, then DT_At, reflects the 
amount of net deferred tax assets as a positive number and zero otherwise.  If gross deferred tax 
liabilities exceed gross deferred tax assets less the valuation allowance, then DT_Lt reflects the 
net deferred tax liabilities as a negative number and zero otherwise. 
Table 11 presents the results of testing for differences in the coefficients of DT_At and 
DT_Lt between the subsamples described in Table 5 and Table 6, Panels A and B. When the 
coefficient on deferred tax items is allowed to vary for firms with net deferred tax assets versus 
net deferred tax liabilities, results and inferences on the association between UTBt and future tax 
cash outflows are similar to the results using the original models except that the positive 
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association reported for firms with M&As but without indemnification becomes significant in 
Table 6, Panel B.  
Consistent with the results in Tables 5 and 6, I find that the associations between future 
tax cash outflows and net deferred taxes for firms with net deferred tax liabilities are 
significantly negative for firms with M&As but without indemnification across all six panels but 
are insignificant for firms with M&As and indemnification.  However, the coefficients across 
M&A firms with and without indemnification are not significantly different from each other.  
These deferred tax liabilities may be intertwined with uncertain tax positions; for instance, a 
decision to accelerate the cost recovery of an intangible asset in a scenario where tax law is 
unclear about the acceleration may result in a deferred tax liability for a portion of the tax benefit 
and an uncertain tax benefit reserve for the remainder of the tax benefit. Therefore, it is possible 
that the indemnification of uncertain tax positions may also result in the indemnification of net 
deferred tax liabilities, resulting in no association with future tax cash outflows for M&A firms 
with indemnification.  These tests further indicate that the association between net deferred tax 
liabilities and future tax cash outflows is significantly negative for firms without M&As (the 
Table 6, Panel A model) but is not significant when the sample is limited to firms with increased 
UTB reserves due to prior year positions (the Table 6, Panel B model).  Moreover, this 
association is significantly different for no M&A firms and M&A firms without indemnification 
for this reduced sample of firms.  It is not clear why this difference arises, however, overall, 
these results provide weak evidence that net deferred tax liabilities may also be covered by tax 
indemnification clauses. 
In contrast to the net deferred tax liability results, I find that the associations between 
deferred taxes and future tax cash outflows are more inconsistent for firms that report net DTAs 
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across the panels of Table 11 and when compared to Tables 5 and 6 results. Specifically, I 
document in two panels a negative association between DT_At and FUT_TXPDt for firms 
engaging in M&As without indemnification and that these associations are significantly different 
from the associations documented for firms engaging in M&As with indemnification. 
Furthermore, I document a positive association between DT_At and FUT_TXPDt for firms not 
engaging in an M&A. Recall that DTt was expected to have a negative association with future tax 
cash outflows and both DT_At and DT_Lt were expected to have a negative association. I offer 
two potential explanations for these results. First, a net deferred tax asset may signal 
management’s expectations regarding future income increases. Managers are required to record a 
valuation allowance to reduce deferred tax assets if it is not more-likely-than not that they will 
generate sufficient income to utilize the assets. Therefore, it is possible any remaining positive 
amounts may be indicative of future increases in taxable income for the firm. Second, as 
discussed above, if an uncertain tax position is successfully challenged for a firm with an M&A 
net deferred tax assets and future tax cash outflows.  Further research is needed to fully 
understand why the association between deferred taxes and future tax cash outflows differ for 
firms with net deferred tax assets versus firms with net deferred tax liabilities, regardless of 
whether the firms have M&As with indemnification.  
Overall, these results are consistent with tax indemnification influencing the association 
between net deferred tax assets (liabilities) and future tax cash outflows. Therefore, financial 
statement users should exercise caution when utilizing deferred tax assets and liabilities to 





Table 11: Comparison of Net Deferred Tax Assets and Liabilities Across Subsamples 
These panels present the results of reperforming main analyses from Table 5 through Table 6, 
Panel B after replacing DTt with DT_At and DT_Lt. Refer to cross-referenced Tables for 
additional information. 
 










VARIABLES (+,-) FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 
       
UTBt (β1)/(α1) + 14.0513** 0.0090 41.2550*** 2.6560 
  (2.040) (0.000) (3.970) (0.750) 
DT_At (β7)/(α7) - -1.8157 0.2419 -9.8694** 0.9323 
  (-0.710) (0.150) (-2.100) (0.500) 
DT_Lt (β8)/(α8) - -5.6413** 0.0495 -6.4851*** -1.7958 
  (-2.180) (0.020) (-3.190) (-0.640) 
      
Other Controls  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  73 282 48 175 
Adjusted R-squared  0.594 0.347 0.630 0.331 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES 
      
Test of differences      
UTBt (β1 = α1)  14.0423  38.5990***  
  [2.02]  [12.52]  
DT_At (β7 = α7)  -2.0576  -10.8017**  
  [0.50]  [4.61]  
DT_Lt (β8 = α8)  -5.6908  -4.6893  
  [2.62]  [1.85]  
      
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 Answering the call of Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) for research on how acquirers deal 
with targets’ uncertain tax positions, I find that tax indemnification is commonly present in 
M&A contracts to minimize the acquirer’s exposure to the targets’ tax uncertainties. The 
indemnification of uncertain tax positions results in several accounting issues. First, the 
reflection of third-party contingencies within UTB reserves may decrease the usefulness of these 
reserves for estimating future tax cash outflows. Second, the adjustment of indemnified tax 
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Table 11: Comparison of Net Deferred Tax Assets and Liabilities Across Subsamples 
(Cont.) 
These panels present the results of reperforming main analyses from Table 5 through Table 6, 














VARIABLES (+,-) FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 
       
UTBt (β1)/(α1) + 42.4440*** -2.3809 8.8304 -3.3295 
  (3.950) (-0.420) (0.380) (-0.280) 
DT_At (β7)/(α7) - -9.7545** 1.2103 -1.3744 3.5696 
  (-2.100) (0.540) (-0.120) (0.820) 
DT_Lt (β8)/(α8) - -7.0960*** -2.8162 -6.0040** 0.0878 
  (-3.400) (-0.920) (-2.250) (0.010) 
      
Other Controls  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  45 123 25 26 
Adjusted R-squared  0.614 0.286 0.374 0.271 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES 
      
Test of differences      
UTBt (β1 = α1)  44.8249***  12.1599  
  [13.82]  [0.22]  
DT_At (β7 = α7)  -10.9648**  -4.9440  
  [4.60]  [0.16]  
DT_Lt (β8 = α8)  -4.2798  -6.0918  
  [1.35]  [0.69]  
 
positions may distort both GAAP and cash ETRs. Third, the presence of indemnification may 
distort the associations between net deferred tax assets (liabilities) and future tax cash outflows. 
Because of the significant impact that tax indemnification has on UTB reserves, ETRs and net 
deferred tax assets (liabilities), researchers, auditors and investors should consider the potential 
impact of tax indemnification when developing tax risk and expectation models. Furthermore, 
my findings suggest that additional studies may be warranted to further explore the pricing, 
ETRs, net deferred tax assets (liabilities) and accrual quality-related issues when tax 
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Table 11: Comparison of Net Deferred Tax Assets and Liabilities Across Subsamples 
(Cont.) 
These panels present the results of reperforming main analyses from Table 5 through Table 6, 
Panel B after replacing DTt with DT_At and DT_Lt. Refer to cross-referenced Tables for 
additional information. 
 












VARIABLES (+,-) FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 
      
UTBt (δ1)/(β1)/(α1) + 4.2015*** 10.1280* -0.2543 
  (2.420) (1.520) (-0.030) 
DT_At (δ6)/(β6)/(α6) - 1.9281*** -2.1090 0.1554 
  (2.790) (-0.860) (0.090) 
DT_Lt (δ7)/(β7)/(α7) - -1.6196** -4.9973** 0.0628 
  (-2.170) (-2.090) (0.030) 
     
Other Controls  YES YES YES 
Observations  5,937 73 282 
Adjusted R-squared  0.377 0.614 0.343 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES 
     
Test of differences     
UTBt (δ1 = β1)/(δ1  = α1)   -5.9265 4.4558 
   [0.74] [0.29] 
DT_At (δ6 = β6)/(δ6  = α6)   4.0371 1.7727 
   [2.56] [1.08] 
DT_Lt (δ7 = β7)/(δ7  = α7)   3.3777 -1.6824 
   [1.88] [0.46] 
 
indemnification is present. However, additional analyses suggest that the presence of M&As and 
other readily available information about M&As is not an adequate proxy for indemnification.  
Therefore, researchers should rely on filed M&A contracts when examining the potential impact 
of tax indemnification on prior research and when designing future research on UTB reserves. 
To minimize accounting issues related to tax indemnification, the FASB could consider 
the following five recommendations: implement guidance that allows the reversing of mirror  
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Table 11: Comparison of Net Deferred Tax Assets and Liabilities Across Subsamples 
(Cont.) 
These panels present the results of reperforming main analyses from Table 5 through Table 6, 
Panel B after replacing DTt with DT_At and DT_Lt. Refer to cross-referenced Tables for 
additional information. 
 












VARIABLES (+,-) FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 FUT_TXPDt+4 
      
UTBt (δ1)/(β1)/(α1) + 2.7784* 20.8612* 2.1846 
  (1.600) (1.360) (0.520) 
DT_At (δ6)/(β6)/(α6) - 1.4933** -6.9755 0.8060 
  (1.900) (-1.100) (0.430) 
DT_Lt (δ7)/(β7)/(α7) - 0.0663 -6.2864*** -1.5654 
  (0.080) (-2.970) (-0.550) 
     
Other Controls  YES YES YES 
Observations  2,959 50 175 
Adjusted R-squared  0.407 0.579 0.329 
Year Fixed Effects  YES YES YES 
     
Test of differences     
UTBt (δ1 = β1)/(δ1  = α1)   -18.0828 0.5938 
   [1.38] [0.02] 
DT_At (δ6 = β6)/(δ6  = α6)   8.4688 0.6873 
   [1.75] [0.13] 
DT_Lt (δ7 = β7)/(δ7  = α7)   6.3527** 1.6317 
   [7.92] [0.31] 
  
accounting entries originally used to record the indemnified position, standardize the disclosure 
of tax cash outflows associated with indemnified tax positions to ensure consistency of these 
disclosures, require the disclosure of indemnification assets, require the disclosure of acquired 
uncertain tax positions and require the disclosure of uncertain positions which have been 
indemnified or insured.  
The documented results and conclusions are subject to several caveats. First, I am only 
able to obtain contracts for M&As which the reporting firm chose to file. Performing regressions 
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on the full population of M&A contracts may result in different conclusions. Second, firms often 
do not file the supporting schedules for M&A contracts. These supporting schedules may 
disclose specific tax positions or limits to the indemnification which could significantly impact 
indemnification coverage. Third, M&A parties may obtain or provide third-party insurance 
instead of offering indemnification. By providing insurance, some contracts may indicate no 
indemnification is present, but the acquirer may be protected through insurance. However, per 
discussions with insurance providers, representations and warranties insurance is often provided 
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CETR The sum of future tax cash outflows (TXPD) over the next four years to 
the sum of net pretax income (PI – SPI) over the next four years. 
  
CONS The ratio of merger consideration to ending total assets in year t (AT). 
  
DT  The ratio of net deferred taxes (TXNDB) to ending total assets in year t 
(AT). 
  
DT_A  If net deferred taxes (TXNDB) is greater than zero, the ratio of net 
deferred taxes to ending total assets in year t (AT), zero otherwise. 
  
DT_L  If net deferred taxes (TXNDB) is less than zero, the ratio of net deferred 
taxes to ending total assets in year t (AT), zero otherwise. 
  
DTX  The ratio of net deferred taxes adjusted for UTBs that relate to 
temporary book-tax differences (TXNDB-(TXTUBEND-
TXTUBTXTR)) to ending total assets in year t (AT). 
  
INDEMN Indicator variable equal to one if the observation obtained 
indemnification through M&A contract, zero otherwise. 
  
FUT_TXPD The log of the sum of future tax cash outflows (TXPD) over the next 
four years to ending total assets in year t (AT). 
  
GETR The sum of future tax expense (TXT) over the next four years to the sum 
of net pretax income (PI – SPI) over the next four years. 
  
NOLCF The ratio of net operating loss carryforwards (NOLCF) to beginning 
total assets (AT) in year t. 
  
∆_PTBI The difference in pretax book income in year t and pretax book income 
in year t-1, scaled by ending total assets in year t (AT). 
  
UTB The ratio of reported unrecognized tax benefits (TXTUBEND) to ending 
total assets (AT) in year t. 
  
TXPD The ratio of taxes paid (TXPD) to ending total assets in year t (AT). 
  
∆_TXPD The difference between taxes paid in year t and taxes paid in year t-1, 




Appendix B: Excerpts from M&A Contracts on Indemnification 
 
EXAMPLES OF INDEMNIFICATION 
Stock Purchase Agreement between Forward Air Corporation, TQI Holdings, Inc., and the 
“Sellers” named herein (Dated March 4, 2013) 
Tax Matters: 
8.1  Representations and Obligations Regarding Taxes. The Company hereby represents and 
warrants to and agree with Buyer that, except as set forth on Schedule 8.1 hereto: (a) 
Each Entity has filed all federal income and all other material Tax Returns that it has 
been required to file. All such Tax Returns were correct and complete in all material 
respects. All Taxes owed by the Entities (whether or not shown on any Tax Return and 
whether or not any Tax Return was required) have been paid. Since March 7, 2008, no 
claim has been made by a taxing authority in a jurisdiction where any Entity does not file 
Tax Returns that such Entity is subject to taxation by that jurisdiction. 
8.2  Indemnification for Taxes. (a) From and after the Closing, the Sellers shall severally (in 
accordance with each Seller's Proportionate Share) indemnify the Entities and Buyer 
(each herein sometimes referred to as an "Indemnified Taxpayer") against, and protect, 
save and hold harmless each Indemnified Taxpayer from, any and all out-of-pocket 
damages, deficiencies, losses and reasonable expenses, including, without limitation, 
reasonable attorneys', accountants' and experts' fees and disbursements (all herein 
referred to as "Losses") resulting from: (i) except to the extent reflected in the calculation 
of Closing Date Working Capital, any Taxes of any Entity allocable to any period ending 
on or prior to the Closing Date or, as provided in Section 8.3(c) hereof, allocable to any 
period that begins before and ends after the Closing Date; (ii) any Tax of any Person 
other than an Entity for periods ending on or before the Closing Date imposed upon any 
Entity as a result of the Entity being included prior to the Closing Date in a combined, 
consolidated or unitary Tax group under Treasury Regulation Section 1.1502-6 (or any 
similar provision of the applicable law of any Governmental Authority) or, as a transferee 
or successor, by contract or otherwise, except for a Contract the principal purpose of 
which is not to indemnify or pay the Taxes of another person; (iii) the failure to pay state 
income Taxes or state franchise Taxes in any state other than the State of Michigan prior 
to the Closing Date but not thereafter (the “Potential State Tax Matters”); (iv) any 
misrepresentation or breach of any representation, warranty or obligation set forth in this 
Article VIII; or (v) any real property transfer, recordation or similar tax imposed by the 




Asset Purchase Agreement between Depomed, Inc. and Xanodyne Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
(Dated June 21, 2012): 
Representations and Warranties of the Seller: 
2.3 Taxes. 
(a)  The Seller has timely filed all material Tax Returns that it has been required to file, and 
all such Tax Returns were true, correct and complete in all material respects. The Seller 
has paid on a timely basis all Taxes that have been due from and payable by the Seller. 
For purposes of this Agreement, (i) “Taxes” means (A) all taxes, charges, fees, duties, 
levies or other similar assessments or liabilities in the nature of a tax, including income, 
excess profits, gross receipts, net proceeds, alternative or add-on minimum, ad valorem, 
premium, value-added, excise, real property, personal property (tangible and intangible), 
inventory, stamp, capital stock, sales, use, service, transfer, withholding, employment, 
social security, unemployment, disability, payroll, occupational, severance, estimated and 
franchise taxes imposed by any Taxing Authority and (B) any interest, fines, penalties, 
assessments or additions to tax resulting from, attributable to or incurred in connection 
with any tax described in clause (A) or any contest or dispute thereof, (ii) “Tax Returns” 
means all reports, returns, declarations, statements or other information required to be 
supplied to any Taxing Authority in connection with Taxes (including any attachments 
thereto or amendments thereof), (iii) “Taxing Authority” means any U.S. or non-U.S. 
federal, state, municipal or local government, court, tribunal, agency, commission, 
regulatory authority or instrumentality or any other entity or person exercising executive, 
legislative, judicial, regulatory or administrative authority to impose, levy or assess any 
Tax, and (iv) “Tax Law” means any U.S. or non-U.S. federal, state, provincial, municipal 
or local law, statute, ordinance, treaty, common law, rule, regulation, standard, judgment, 
order, writ, injunction, decree, arbitration award, agency requirement, license or permit of 
any Taxing Authority. The Seller has complied in all material respects with all applicable 
Tax Laws relating to the filing of Tax Returns and the payment and withholding of 
Taxes, and all Taxes that the Seller has been required by Tax Law to withhold or collect 
have been duly withheld or collected and, to the full extent required, have been properly 
paid to the appropriate Taxing Authorities. 
Indemnification: 
5.1  Indemnification by the Seller. Subject to the terms and conditions of this Article V, from 
and after the Closing, the Seller shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless the Buyer and 
the Buyer’s directors, officers and employees from and against any and all losses, 
damages, obligations, liabilities, claims, fines, fees, penalties, interest, awards, judgments 
and claims of any kind, including reasonable attorneys’ and consultants’ fees and 
expenses and other reasonable legal costs and expenses incurred in prosecution, 
investigation, remediation, defense or settlement (collectively, “Damages”) resulting 
from, based on, arising out of, in connection with or constituting: 
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(a)  the inaccuracy or any breach of any of the representations or warranties of the Seller 
contained in this Agreement or any agreement or certificate required to be delivered by 
the Seller pursuant to this Agreement; 
(b)  any breach or failure to perform by the Seller of any covenant or agreement contained in 
this Agreement; 
(c)  any non-compliance with applicable bulk sales laws; 
(d)  any claims brought by employees, independent contractors or consultants of the Seller, 
including, but not limited to, those who were or are terminated prior to or as of the 
Closing Date; (e) Transaction Fees incurred by the Seller; 
(f)  any Excluded Liabilities; 
(g)  any Excluded Assets; or 
(h)  one half (1/2) of any Damages incurred by the Buyer in connection with the matters set 
forth in Schedules 2.4(a), 2.4(d) and 2.4(e) of the Seller Disclosure Schedule. 
 
EXAMPLE OF NO INDEMNIFICATION 
Agreement and Plan of Merger between Visa, Inc. and Cybersource, Corp. (Dated April 
20, 2010): 
Representations and Warranties of the Company: 
2.6 Taxes. 
(b)  Taxes, Tax Returns and Audits. 
(i)  The Company and each of its Subsidiaries have (A) duly and timely filed or 
caused to be filed all Tax Returns and such Tax Returns are true, correct, and 
complete in all material respects, (B) duly and timely paid or withheld (and timely 
paid over any withheld amounts to the appropriate Governmental Entity) all 
Taxes required to be paid or withheld whether or not shown as due on any Tax 
Return, and (C) established reserves in accordance with GAAP that are adequate 
for the payment of all Taxes not yet due and payable with respect to the assets and 
operations of the Company and each Subsidiary through the date of this 
Agreement. 
(ii)  Neither the Company nor any of its Subsidiaries has any liability for unpaid Taxes 
which have not been accrued or reserved on the Company Financials, whether 
asserted or unasserted, contingent or otherwise, and neither the Company nor any 
of its Subsidiaries has incurred any liability for Taxes since the date of the 




8.1  Non-Survival of Representations and Warranties. The representations and warranties of 
the Company, Parent and Merger Sub contained in this Agreement, or any instrument 
delivered pursuant to this Agreement, shall terminate at the Effective Time, and only the 
covenants that by their terms survive the Effective Time and this Article VIII shall 
survive the Effective Time. 
 
 
